Target 18: Harmful subsidies

Generated: 2026-04-19T20:28:22Z

Landscape

Sixty-nine countries carry Target 18 material in their plans. Forty explicitly address harmful subsidy reform, twenty-three treat it as an adjacent concern without a dedicated target, and six have no identifiable content. The dominant architecture follows the Kunming-Montreal two-stage sequence: identify or inventory harmful incentives by a mid-decade date, then reform, phase out, or eliminate by 2030, starting with the most harmful. Named sectors cluster around agriculture, fossil fuels, fisheries, forestry, and transport, with positive-incentive tracks — payments for ecosystem services, tax exemptions, eco-certification, green credit — almost always paired alongside. Many countries begin from an assessment baseline: inventories, BIOFIN studies, or government-wide reviews are underway rather than concluded.

Variation

Commitment form ranges across quantified reduction targets (Spain at 50% by 2025, Libya at 50%, Yemen halving, Tunisia at 30%, Brazil contributing to the USD 500 billion/year global figure), qualitative phase-out language (United Kingdom, Iran, Sudan, Lesotho, Rwanda), and assessment-only commitments (Bhutan, Gabon, Norway). Timeline architectures differ: two-stage identify-then-reform designs (Brazil, Canada, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Switzerland, Chile, Egypt, United Kingdom, Iran, Thailand), single 2030 deadlines (Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Yemen, Vanuatu), and earlier deadlines — Congo at 2026, Spain and Slovenia at 2025. Sectoral emphasis varies: fossil fuels and energy (Canada, Denmark, Lebanon, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Norway), agriculture and fertilisers (India, Nigeria, Yemen, Malaysia), fisheries (European Union, Lebanon, Malaysia, Marshall Islands), forestry (Switzerland, Sudan), and transport (Austria). Institutional vehicles include dedicated reform policies (Vanuatu's Harmful Subsidies Reform Policy by 2027), monitoring units (Congo), government-wide reviews (Netherlands, Switzerland), BIOFIN partnerships (Gabon, Togo, Colombia, Paraguay), and trust funds (Sudan). Positive-incentive pairing takes the form of tax exemptions for sustainable farmers (Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia), payments for ecosystem services (Madagascar, Rwanda, El Salvador, Vanuatu), eco-labelling (Rwanda), and green budgeting (India). The Netherlands commenced in autumn 2024 a government-wide study into positive and negative effects of national government financial resources on biodiversity, using an assessment method tested internationally with OECD and partner countries.

Standouts

Spain commits that "By 2025, 50% of the identified harmful subsidies are to be reformed, redirected, or eliminated. By 2030, all subsidies or incentives are to be neutral or positive for natural heritage and biodiversity, adequately incorporating environmental externalities." Brazil sets a phased target to "Identify and rank, by 2026, and review, reduce or eliminate, by 2030, in a fair and effective manner, subsidies and economic and fiscal incentives that are directly harmful to biodiversity, starting with those most detrimental in proportion to national GDP, thereby contributing to the global target of at least USD 500 billion per year by 2030." Yemen commits that "By 2030, halve the monetary value of subsidies harmful to biodiversity and promote environmentally positive incentives targeting green technologies, ecosystem-based programs, and clean and renewable energy," with the Action Plan including elimination of subsidies for pumping water for qat cultivation as a specific measure. Tunisia sets the target that "By 2030, 30% of incentives harmful to biodiversity are eliminated."

Canada reports that "In July 2023, Canada became the first G20 country to deliver on its commitment to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies (IFFS) by releasing the Inefficient Fossil Fuel Subsidies Assessment Framework and Guidelines." Austria names two specific fiscal levers: "Advancement of (steering) measures to curb road traffic, e.g. through changes to the commuter tax allowance (Pendlerpauschale) and the company car privilege (Dienstwagenprivileg)." Cameroon anchors its target in a fiscal baseline, estimating "approximately 300-600 billion FCFA/year (6-10% of the public budget) in subsidies potentially harmful to biodiversity. The target is 100% of harmful subsidies identified, with at least 50% redirected or eliminated in favour of positive incentives for biodiversity."

Congo's National Target 19/18 sets a 2026 deadline rather than 2030, committing to "eliminate or progressively reduce incentives, including subsidies harmful to biodiversity," with "Result A4O19R19" containing four actions including "establishment of a subsidies monitoring unit." Vanuatu plans to develop and operationalise "a national Harmful Subsidies Reform Policy, with approval by the appropriate national authority (BAC/COM) targeted by 2027," with a threshold of at least three harmful subsidy schemes having reform measures initiated by 2030. Afghanistan states plainly: "Afghanistan will not address Target 18."

Analysis

The dominant architecture across the set is sequenced: identify or inventory by a mid-decade milestone, reform by 2030. This design places substantive reform after the assessment stage and makes the 2025–2027 assessment products — inventories, BIOFIN studies, government-wide reviews — the near-term marker of movement.

Quantified reform targets are the exception rather than the norm. Most explicit addressers commit to identification and reform without specifying a monetary value, percentage, or share of baseline to be redirected; the subset attaching a numeric figure to the reform itself is small.

Where plans name specific instruments rather than generic categories — Austria's commuter tax allowance and company car privilege, Yemen's qat water-pumping subsidies, India's GOBAR-Dhan scheme and agricultural power subsidies, Cameroon's FCFA fiscal baseline — the reform agenda becomes traceable in a way that generic commitments do not.

Positive and negative incentive tracks are almost always paired. Payments for ecosystem services, tax exemptions for sustainable producers, and eco-certification recur as the positive instruments most frequently named alongside the harmful-subsidy reform commitment.

Per-country detail

Ordered by classification (explicitly_addresses → relevant_to → not_identified) then alphabetically by country name.

Country	National Target	Summary
Argentina	Identify, reform or eliminate incentives harmful to biological diversity. Replace them in a proportionate, fair, effective and equitable manner with other incentives that favour and protect biodiversity.	National Target 18 commits to identifying, reforming, or eliminating incentives harmful to biological diversity, and replacing them in a proportionate, fair, effective, and equitable manner with other incentives that favour and protect biodiversity. The Axis 4 section on certification and incentives (4.1.C.3) provides a positive-incentive complement: promoting an adequate incentive regime for the conservation of natural environments, associated ecological goods and services, and biological diversity in agroecosystems. This includes enacting regulations or establishing incentives for agricultural and livestock activities that encourage maintenance of unaltered natural habitat as remnant patches, and promoting incentives for multi-year lease contracts. While these actions focus on creating new positive incentives rather than reforming harmful ones, they represent the incentive-reform approach within the production sector.
Austria		The funding chapter (§8) explicitly frames the reform of biodiversity-damaging funding as a pillar of biodiversity financing: resources for conservation and sustainable use are to be increased while biodiversity-damaging funding and subsidies are to be largely phased out and biodiversity-supporting incentives simultaneously increased. A stated objective is that biodiversity-damaging funding has been reduced, redirected in a positive direction, or stopped entirely. Under immediate measures for financing (§8.1), the strategy foresees evaluation and maximum possible phasing-out of biodiversity-damaging incentives and subsidies — also in the international context — and their restructuring into biodiversity-promoting incentives and subsidies. Analysis and evaluation of all possible financing sources includes resources from the restructuring of biodiversity-damaging incentives and subsidies. Under Chapter 7 (legal framework), advancement of measures in transport includes steering instruments such as changes to the commuter tax allowance (Pendlerpauschale) and the company car privilege (Dienstwagenprivileg) as examples of fiscal levers to curb road traffic. No quantified subsidy-reform volume is stated.
Brazil	Identify and rank, by 2026, and review, reduce or eliminate, by 2030, in a fair and effective manner, subsidies and economic and fiscal incentives that are directly harmful to biodiversity, starting with those most detrimental in proportion to national GDP, thereby contributing to the global target of at least USD 500 billion per year by 2030. In parallel, progressively increase positive incentives for the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of biodiversity and sociobiodiversity across different ecosystems, including urban and peri-urban areas, with the active participation of civil society organisations, as well as Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities.	The NBSAP establishes National Target 18, committing to identify and rank by 2026, and review, reduce or eliminate by 2030, in a fair and effective manner, subsidies and economic and fiscal incentives that are directly harmful to biodiversity. The target specifies starting with those most detrimental in proportion to national GDP, thereby contributing to the global target of at least USD 500 billion per year by 2030. In parallel, the target calls for progressively increasing positive incentives for the conservation, restoration, and sustainable use of biodiversity and sociobiodiversity across different ecosystems, including urban and peri-urban areas, with the active participation of civil society organisations, Indigenous Peoples, and Local Communities. The threats chapter notes that financial resources allocated to biodiversity remain insufficient, with global spending estimated at USD 124-143 billion per year in 2019 against a need of USD 722-967 billion. The Academia Workshop participants stressed the importance of eliminating harmful incentives to biodiversity, promoting sustainable technologies and practices, and assigning monetary value to biodiversity and its losses. Synergies are identified with SDGs 12.c and 14.6.
Bhutan	By 2030, strategic interventions on incentives are streamlined to safeguard biodiversity	Bhutan's National Target 18 states: "By 2030, strategic interventions on incentives are streamlined to safeguard biodiversity," aligned with KMGBF Target 18. The rationale notes that Bhutan's development over the past six decades has been supported by substantial public subsidies across agriculture, forestry, and rural sectors, ranging from seeds and fertilizers to livestock, timber, and firewood. The NBSAP states that while these incentives have largely supported sustainability, their specific impacts on biodiversity remain under-assessed. One strategy with four actions is identified: conducting a comprehensive impact assessment of incentives encompassing review of policies, strategies, and legislation; identifying and prioritizing incentives having adverse impacts on biodiversity; assessing the severity of adverse impacts of at least one prioritized subsidy and recommending its repurposing; and developing a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework to track the impacts of subsidies on biodiversity over time.
Canada		Canada's NBSAP notes that Canada has been scaling up positive incentives for biodiversity (Canada Nature Fund, Natural Climate Solutions Fund, Low Carbon Economy Fund, EcoAction Community Funding Program, Green Infrastructure programs). In July 2023, Canada became the first G20 country to deliver on its commitment to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies (IFFS) by releasing the Inefficient Fossil Fuel Subsidies Assessment Framework and Guidelines. The federal government is developing a plan to phase out public financing for fossil fuels by fall 2024. The strategy invests in nature-positive actions through the $2.3B Enhanced Nature Legacy and pilots innovative tools such as the National Conservation Exchange (ECCC) to recognize the biodiversity value of private sector and industry conservation investments. The federal government commits to undertake foundational work by mid-2025 to define incentives (including subsidies), compile an inventory of incentives from sectors and activities that may impact biodiversity, and develop a framework to assess them; to build on current initiatives to address negative incentives (including the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies once in force); and by 2030 to substantially and progressively reduce the value of incentives and subsidies with harmful impacts on biodiversity, starting with the most harmful, while scaling up positive incentives through an implementation plan developed with key partners.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	By 2027, incentives, including subsidies, are identified, mapped by sector and assessed for their impact on biodiversity and ecosystem services, and fair legal and administrative measures are taken and implemented to, by 2030, eliminate, phase out or modify incentives harmful to biodiversity, starting with the most damaging, and strengthen positive incentives in favour of the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.	Objective 18 commits the DRC to identifying, mapping and assessing incentives — including subsidies — harmful to biodiversity and ecosystem services by 2027, and to eliminating, phasing out or reforming them by 2030, starting with the most damaging. The objective also strengthens positive incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.
Republic of the Congo	Target 19/18: By 2026 at the latest, eliminate or progressively reduce incentives, including subsidies harmful to biodiversity, in order to minimise or avoid unfavourable impacts, and strengthen positive incentives in favour of the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.	National Target 19/18 commits — unusually, by 2026 rather than 2030 — to eliminate or progressively reduce incentives, including subsidies harmful to biodiversity, in order to minimise or avoid unfavourable impacts, and to strengthen positive incentives in favour of the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Result A4O19R19 contains four actions: establishment of a subsidies monitoring unit; establishment of mechanisms for reducing incentives harmful to biodiversity conservation; intensification of education and awareness-raising actions against incentives harmful to biodiversity conservation; and identification and measurement of the monetary value of subsidies harmful to biological diversity. Indicators include a list of positive incentive measures put in place to promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable use; the value of subsidies and other incentives harmful to biodiversity that have been eliminated, progressively phased out or reformed; the number of legal texts setting taxes and fees in favour of biodiversity; education and awareness-raising programmes for populations; and the annual amount and list of subsidies harmful to biodiversity. Responsible bodies include the ministries for finance, the environment, primary education, agriculture, trade, forests, secondary education, water resources, merchant navy, transport, mining, the interior, hydrocarbons, and energy, with local authorities. Timelines and budget figures for individual actions are not stated in the extracted table.
Switzerland		The NBSAP addresses harmful subsidies under SBS Objective 5, noting that subsidies creating potentially harmful incentives far exceed expenditure devoted to promoting biodiversity. Under the first action plan (AP SBS I), eight federal subsidies were identified for examination of their harmful effects on biodiversity. On 19 June 2024, the Federal Council adopted targeted reform proposals concerning subsidies and other incentives in forestry policy (forest access roads), agricultural policy (customs protection, food supply security contributions, structural improvement contributions, promotion of milk, meat and egg sales), and regional policy (loans for infrastructure projects). For forest-related subsidies, the legal framework is deemed sufficient but improvements are possible at the implementation level. At the end of 2024, the federal administration was to report to the Federal Council on progress. Measure M10 (Review and updating of subsidies and incentives), under FOEN responsibility with a broad set of federal partners, sets an objective that by 2030 the effects of federal subsidies on biodiversity (explicit subsidies and tax relief) are systematically examined and taken into account in decisions, with the main harmful incentives addressed. New subsidies are also to be reviewed for possible biodiversity impacts. Reporting products include Federal Council decisions on next steps at end of 2024, CBD-directed reports in 2026, 2028, and 2030, and exchanges of experience with the cantons on subsidy reform between 2025 and 2027 (e.g. annual workshops). Several cantons have begun work on their own subsidies.
Chile	II.14: By 2027, have a diagnosis and a proposal for sectoral commitments (measures) and by 2029, have a report on the measures adopted to reduce harmful incentives to biodiversity contained in regulations at the national level. II.15: By 2027, have a diagnosis and a proposal for sectoral commitments (measures), and by 2029, have a report on the measures adopted to increase positive incentives for biodiversity	The NBSAP addresses incentive reform through two national targets under Objective II. National target II.14 requires a diagnosis and proposal for sectoral commitments to reduce harmful incentives to biodiversity contained in national-level regulations by 2027, followed by a report on measures adopted by 2029. National target II.15 mirrors this timeline for increasing positive incentives for biodiversity, with a diagnosis and proposal by 2027 and a report on adopted measures by 2029. The gap analysis notes that Target 18 lacked a national target in the previous NBS. The Agri-food Sustainability Strategy is identified as a linked instrument.
Cameroon		The NBSAP dedicates Objective 26 to the identification and redirection of incentives and subsidies harmful to biodiversity, structured around three actions. Action 26.1 addresses the identification of incentives and subsidies harmful to biodiversity. Activity 26.1.1 calls for an audit of public policies, programmes and existing subsidies, with the baseline estimated at approximately 300-600 billion FCFA/year (6-10% of the public budget) in subsidies potentially harmful to biodiversity. The target is 100% of harmful subsidies identified, with at least 50% redirected or eliminated in favour of positive incentives for biodiversity. The audit is to be conducted by a joint MINEPDED-MINFI team with external consultants, covering sectoral ministries including Agriculture, Energy and Transport. Action 26.2 addresses the reorientation of incentives and subsidies in favour of biodiversity. Activity 26.2.1 establishes a formal multi-stakeholder consultation framework involving donors, the financial and non-financial private sector, Government, CSOs and IPLC representatives. The framework is to be officially established and operational, with quarterly coordination meetings and annual implementation reports. No such framework exists at baseline. Action 26.3 promotes positive incentive mechanisms for the sustainable management of biodiversity. Activity 26.3.1 supports green or eco-responsible subsidy programmes, targeting approximately 30-60 billion FCFA/year (approximately 50-100 million USD/year) mobilised annually through incentives and green subsidies, traceable and integrated into the national budget (from a baseline of approximately 6-15 billion FCFA/year). The same activity targets approximately 18-25 operational positive incentives, documented and integrated into the national budget with at least 3 per major sector (from a baseline of approximately 3-6 pilot and sectoral mechanisms).
Colombia		The NBSAP initiated the analysis for the formulation and implementation of a route for the reform of sectoral incentives and subsidies harmful to biodiversity through a study of biodiversity-loss drivers under the 2017 National Policy for the Integrated Management of Biodiversity and its Ecosystem Services (PNGIBSE). The first national study of harmful incentives was carried out by the BIOFIN/UNDP Initiative between 2021 and 2022 in the agricultural and rural development sector, identifying possible reform routes for four sectoral instruments. Starting in 2024, work began with Finagro to consolidate a route for greening its credit lines with support from BIOFIN. Further harmful-incentive analyses were prioritised for (1) mining, energy and hydrocarbons; (2) livestock-forestry and fisheries-aquaculture; (3) food and beverages, pulp, paper and cardboard, and chemicals; (4) commerce and tourism; and (5) transport. The energy and hydrocarbons study identified 24 energy and 18 hydrocarbons instruments; preliminary analysis found 8 positive instruments (3 energy, 5 hydrocarbons), 10 negative (4 energy, 6 hydrocarbons) and 24 mixed instruments (17 energy, 7 hydrocarbons). The agricultural forestry and fisheries/aquaculture study proposes a roadmap for elimination of negative incentives and creation or strengthening of positive incentives. For headline indicator reporting, the Plan requires: creation of unified criteria to identify positive incentives; assembly of an inventory of harmful incentives and subsidies from productive sectors financed by the government (and where possible by the private sector due to lack of public regulation); assignment of responsibility to productive-sector authorities for identification, analysis and evaluation of incentives and subsidies; creation of a working group on indicators; and institutionalisation of the methodology and work pathway. DNP-MinAmbiente leads monitoring and reporting, with DNP-Cancillería also identified for related reporting; validation through a multilateral organisation.
Denmark		The NBSAP addresses both the elimination of harmful subsidies and the scaling up of positive incentives. Under the EU's 8th Environment Action Programme, Denmark is committed to step up efforts to phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, including energy subsidies and particularly fossil fuel subsidies. Denmark regularly reports on environmentally harmful subsidies to the European Commission. According to the 2024 National Energy and Climate Plan, no direct support or subsidies are granted for fossil fuels in Denmark. Denmark backed a Joint Statement on Fossil Fuel Subsidies in 2023. The signatories have undertaken to develop national overviews of both direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies and to develop national strategies for phasing them out. Denmark participates in the Friends of Fossil Fuels Subsidy Reform (FFFSR) coalition, working in the G20, WTO, and international climate negotiations. Denmark also supports capacity building for phasing out fossil fuel subsidies in India, Indonesia, and South Africa through a grant to the International Institute for Sustainable Development. On positive incentives, several grant schemes have been established. Climate carbon-rich soil projects received DKK 1.71 billion and DKK 2.56 billion respectively in 2021-2024. The Water and Climate Projects grant scheme has approximately DKK 1.2 billion allocated by 2027. These combine greenhouse gas reduction with nature, environment, and aquatic objectives.
Egypt	By 2027, identify incentives, including subsidies harmful to biodiversity, and progressively phase them out/reform them/eliminate them, in a fair and effective manner, and expand the scope of positive incentives and establish mechanisms for implementing incentives for companies to adopt biodiversity-friendly technologies and practices	The NBSAP sets a national target of identifying, by 2027, incentives including subsidies harmful to biodiversity and progressively phasing them out, reforming, or eliminating them in a fair and effective manner, while expanding positive incentives and establishing mechanisms for companies to adopt biodiversity-friendly technologies and practices. Positive incentives are to include grants and concessional loans for environmentally friendly projects (organic farming, ecotourism), support for green technology (sustainable irrigation, renewable energy), tax exemptions for farmers adopting sustainable or protected agriculture, and incentives for institutions managing areas of environmental importance. Negative incentives are to include fines and legal penalties for activities destroying habitats or harming threatened species; prison sentences for serious environmental crimes; revocation of licences and closure of polluting facilities; elimination of government subsidies for unsustainable practices (water-intensive agriculture, polluting industries); increased environmental fees on polluting activities and carbon-intensive heavy industries; strict restrictions on access to reserves and wetlands; tightened fishing laws; and prosecution of illegal traders in threatened species. Section 59 elaborates the types of incentives — financial (tax exemptions, support, concessional loans), policy (facilitations and privileges for biodiversity-friendly practices, reduced pesticide use, improved water management), and educational/training — and gives examples: support for sustainable-agriculture farmers, facilitations for ecotourism companies, and financial support and tax exemptions for renewable-energy projects. Challenges cited include weak environmental awareness, limited funding, and need for oversight. Recommendations include cross-sectoral cooperation, awareness campaigns, and diversifying incentives to include environmental technology and green innovation.
Spain		The NBSAP contains specific commitments on identifying and reforming biodiversity-harmful subsidies. Subsidies and incentives that are directly or indirectly harmful to natural heritage and biodiversity are to be identified and prioritised by 2025. By 2025, 50% of the identified harmful subsidies are to be reformed, redirected, or eliminated. By 2030, all subsidies or incentives are to be neutral or positive for natural heritage and biodiversity, adequately incorporating environmental externalities. Biodiversity compatibility criteria are to be applied to financing and public support of projects and activities through credits, loans, guarantees, grants, incentives, or subsidies, in line with the EU Taxonomy Regulation (Regulation 2020/852). The 'user pays' and 'polluter pays' principles must be applied to prevent and remedy degradation of nature.
Gabon	Reduce harmful incentives and strengthen positive incentives for biodiversity (see BIOFIN)	Gabon's National Target 18 aims to reduce harmful incentives and strengthen positive incentives for biodiversity, with an explicit reference to the BIOFIN initiative. The strategic actions are to conduct studies on the assessment of investment policies and their impacts on biodiversity. The key indicator is at least 2 studies completed. The responsible stakeholders are the Ministry of Economy and MEEC. The action plan text repeats the same study action twice, suggesting this may be a formatting artefact in the source document. The target is framed around understanding the current incentive landscape before reforming it, rather than specifying particular subsidies to be eliminated.
United Kingdom	The UK will identify by 2025, and eliminate, phase out or reform by 2030, incentives, including subsidies, harmful for biodiversity, in a proportionate, just, fair, effective and equitable way, while contributing to the global target to reduce them by at least $500 billion per year by 2030, starting with the most harmful incentives, and scaling up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.	The NBSAP sets UK target 18, committing to identify by 2025 and eliminate, phase out or reform by 2030 incentives, including subsidies, harmful for biodiversity, in a proportionate, just, fair, effective and equitable way. The target commits to contributing to the global target to reduce harmful incentives by at least $500 billion per year by 2030, starting with the most harmful incentives, and scaling up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
India	Identify and repurpose incentives detrimental to biodiversity, including subsidies, and scale up positive incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use progressively.	India's NBSAP commits to identifying and repurposing incentives detrimental to biodiversity, including subsidies, and scaling up positive incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. The headline indicators are positive incentives in place to promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable use (18.1) and the value of subsidies and other incentives harmful to biodiversity (18.2), with component indicators on monetary value of biodiversity-relevant taxes, fees, charges, tradable permits, revenue generated, and the monetary value of payments for ecosystem services. Five national indicators are tracked: number of policy instruments adopted to repurpose subsidies for sustaining biodiversity (18.1); percentage of budget aligned to green budgeting (18.2); trends in states availing incentives to reduce chemical fertiliser subsidies (18.3); trends in development assistance made available to promote organic/bio-fertilizers under the Galvanizing Organic Bio-Agro Resources Dhan (GOBAR-Dhan) scheme (18.4); and trends in power charge recovery and write-off in the agriculture sector by state-level power utilities (18.5). Lead agencies include the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers supported by the National Institute of Agricultural Extension Management (MANAGE), Ministry of Finance, NITI Aayog, Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, Ministry of Power, and State Agriculture Departments.
Iran	Identify by 2025, and eliminate, phase out, or reform incentives, including subsidies harmful to biodiversity, in a proportionate, just, fair, effective, and equitable manner. Substantially reduce harmful incentives by 2030 and scale up positive incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.	A sub-target within the NT-15 section commits to identifying by 2025, and eliminating, phasing out, or reforming incentives, including subsidies harmful to biodiversity, in a proportionate, just, fair, effective, and equitable manner. It calls for substantially reducing harmful incentives by 2030 and scaling up positive incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. No specific actions are listed beneath this sub-target; the content moves directly to the National Goal-D section header. The 2025 identification deadline and 2030 reduction target mirror the KMGBF language closely.
Japan — National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 2023–2030	Action-oriented target 5-4: Implement efforts to enhance resource mobilization, including identifying and reviewing incentives that are harmful to biodiversity.	Action-oriented target 5-4 addresses incentive reform. Under sub-measure 5-4-6 (designated Priority), the government commits to identify incentive measures — including domestic subsidies — that are harmful to biodiversity, and to review the future direction of such measures after consultation with relevant ministries and agencies and with due consideration to users. At the same time, the government will scale up positive incentives and disseminate good practices. Indicators are listed for both the total value of the budget of subsidies and incentive measures harmful to biodiversity that are abolished, reviewed, or subject to other actions, and for expenditure on positive incentive measures, although current-status and target values are left blank (marked '-') in the plan. Sub-measure 5-4-5 (Priority) commits to consider market-based trading of biodiversity values through the Nationally Certified Sustainably Managed Natural Sites system and to discuss taxation measures as a positive incentive.
Lebanon	NT 21: By 2030, identify and phase out harmful incentives and scale up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.	National Target 21 commits Lebanon to identify and phase out harmful incentives and scale up positive incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use by 2030. Progress is tracked through contributions to Headline Indicators 18.1 (number of positive incentives in place, including biodiversity-relevant taxes, fees and charges, positive subsidies, tradable permits, payments for ecosystem services and biodiversity offsets) and 18.2 (value of subsidies and other incentives harmful to biodiversity, including agricultural subsidies, subsidies to capture fisheries with moderate or high risk of unsustainable fishing, fossil-fuel subsidies, and other harmful subsidies in water, transport and mining sectors). Additional indicators cover the share of SEAs, IEEs and EIAs including biodiversity considerations and a binary indicator on whether a roadmap for aligning incentives with biodiversity goals has been developed. National Actions include implementing and enforcing legislation on Initial Environmental Examinations, EIAs and SEAs with biodiversity considerations (NA 21.1); developing the alignment roadmap; increasing fees for construction permits near ecologically sensitive areas such as buffer zones of protected areas, forests, rivers and marine public domains (NA 21.3); launching national campaigns promoting local organic agricultural products (NA 21.7); providing financial incentives or subsidies to farmers adopting organic farming, agroforestry, aquaculture and conservation agriculture (NA 21.8); increasing fines for forest violations and illegal logging (NA 21.9); and providing tax credits or financial incentives for companies and individuals engaged in ecosystem restoration and sustainable forest management.
Lesotho	By 2030, incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity are eliminated, phased out or reformed in order to minimize or avoid negative impacts, and enhance positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity are developed and implemented	Lesotho's National Target 13 commits to eliminating, phasing out or reforming incentives and subsidies harmful to biodiversity by 2030, while developing and implementing positive incentives for conservation. The total budget is USD 459,767, one of the smallest across the NBSAP. The NBSAP II review notes the Environment Fund Regulations 2022 and Plastic Levy Regulations 2022 as progress on incentive reform. The indicator is the value of subsidies and other incentives harmful to biodiversity that are redirected, repurposed or eliminated. Strategic Initiative 13.1 includes two actions: developing a national database of positive and negative incentives in biodiversity conservation, with data sharing protocols (USD 400,942, 2027/28, led by MFDP Bureau of Statistics); and designing interventions to manage harmful incentives and enhance positive ones, including policy review, regulatory interventions such as the Plastic Levy, awareness raising, and reducing use of harmful subsidies (USD 58,825, 2027/30, led by MEF and MAFSN).
Libya	By 2030, formulate and implement a national strategy to redirect incentives that are harmful to biodiversity (especially the most harmful incentives), and transform 50% of those harmful incentives into incentives that have a positive or neutral impact on biodiversity.	The NBSAP directly addresses harmful incentives through national Target 18 with a USD 9 million budget. The target commits to formulating and implementing a national strategy to redirect incentives that are harmful to biodiversity — especially the most harmful ones — and to transform 50% of those harmful incentives into incentives with a positive or neutral impact on biodiversity by 2030. Five priorities are specified: forming a national team of stakeholders to develop a framework for studying negative incentives and identifying methods to reduce their effects (by 2023); conducting a comprehensive assessment to identify neutral, positive, and negative incentives related to biodiversity at the national level (by 2024); preparing and implementing a national strategy to redirect negative incentives and transform them into neutral or positive ones (by 2030); preparing guidelines for all development sectors on transforming negative incentives (by 2030); and developing a capacity-building plan on incentive transformation (by 2030).
Madagascar	By 2030, incentives that are harmful and negative for biodiversity are eliminated or progressively reduced in order to minimise negative impacts, while positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and natural resources are developed and applied.	The NBSAP commits that by 2030, inappropriate and negative incentives for biodiversity are eliminated or progressively reduced to minimise negative impacts, while positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and natural resources are developed and applied. Initiatives such as payments for ecosystem services have begun, but private-sector participation is noted as remaining low. Seven actions are structured around three strategic axes, with estimated financial needs of USD 1,542,427 (1.91% of Programme 3) — the smallest Programme 3 line — allocated as: progressive reduction and elimination of subsidies harmful to biodiversity (USD 398,225); promotion of positive incentives (USD 398,283); and reform of subsidies and transparency in the use of funding (USD 745,918). Strategic axis 1 analyses and evaluates sectoral budgets and financial flows allocated by subsidy types, conducts IEC campaigns, and makes effective the provisions of the Plan for the reallocation of harmful subsidies (indicator 18.2: value of subsidies and other incentives harmful to biodiversity eliminated, progressively phased out or reformed). Strategic axis 2 capitalises on existing subsidies favourable to biodiversity (indicator 18.1: positive incentive measures in place), conducts IEC campaigns on favourable subsidies, and implements the Plan for the sustainable maximisation of subsidies favourable to biodiversity. Strategic axis 3 reforms public and fiscal policies, makes transparent the use and impacts of public and private funding, conducts training and awareness-raising on harmful subsidies, and mobilises financing in favour of biodiversity (indicator 18.CT.2: monetary value of payments for ecosystem services; 18.CT.3: monetary value of biodiversity offsets). The NBSAP broader financing-mechanism framework commits to progressively eliminating subsidies linked to unsustainable agricultural practices (including livestock and forestry), unregulated exploitation and pollution-generating activities.
Marshall Islands		Sub-target 3.18 calls for establishing private sector incentives across economic sectors that contribute to biodiversity conservation and/or mitigation, delivered through national policy and EPA programs. Headline indicator 18.1 (Private Sector Incentives) tracks positive incentives in place, which may include biodiversity-relevant taxes, fees, charges, subsidies, tradable permits, offsets, and payments for ecosystem services. Headline indicator 18.2 (Private Sector Subsidies) tracks the value of subsidies and other (dis)incentives harmful to biodiversity, including agricultural subsidies, capture fisheries subsidies with risk of encouraging unsustainable fishing, fossil fuel subsidies, and subsidies harmful to biodiversity in other sectors. MoFBPS and RMI EPA are data leads. Action 84 directs MoFBPS, EPPSO, and the Chamber of Commerce to establish and maintain national biodiversity finance, incentive, subsidy, and private-sector disclosure tracking systems. Sub-actions 84b and 84c specifically call for compiling data for indicators 18.1 and 18.2 ahead of the 8th National Report. Action 90a calls for facilitating access to blended finance and partnership opportunities enabling private-sector entities to participate in biodiversity conservation activities.
Mauritania — National Biodiversity Strategy 2022–2030		The NBSAP identifies subsidy reform as both a lesson learnt and an action commitment. The lessons-learnt section lists "reform and redirect subsidies that are harmful to the environment" among the levers for achieving GBF objectives. Action D.1.2 commits to identifying and progressively reforming incentives including subsidies having a negative impact on biodiversity, targeting 3 financial incentives reformed in 3 different sectors by 2027. Action D.1.1 develops fiscal incentives and financial subsidies favouring biodiversity for investment projects in sensitive zones, with 5 types of fiscal incentives and 5 types of subsidies by 2027. Action B.2.3 targets a 50% reduction in harmful fertiliser and chemical use, which implicitly addresses input subsidies. All Axis D financial actions (D.2.1–D.3.3) are also tagged to Target 18.
Netherlands		The NBSAP acknowledges that public financial flows and incentives affect biodiversity both positively and negatively, and that some subsidies may unintentionally be harmful to biodiversity. The government states it is aware that abolishing or redirecting certain financial flows and incentives can reduce ecological pressure, but expressly wishes to consider whether the biodiversity benefits outweigh the possible societal or economic disadvantages for society. In autumn 2024, the Netherlands commenced a government-wide study into the positive and negative effects of national government financial resources on the environment and biodiversity. The Ministry of LVVN has had an assessment method and protocol developed for this purpose so that a standardised approach can be followed. Both products were internationally tested in a workshop with the OECD, the European Commission's Directorate-General for the Environment, Germany, France, Italy, Finland, and Australia. The method aligns with the OECD guidelines and the reporting requirements of both the CBD for Action Target 18 and the European Commission for Environmentally Harmful Subsidies. The study covers multiple sectors and participating ministries are united in a Community of Practice. The study is due to be completed by mid-2025, after which possible follow-up steps for improvement will be explored. The annex provides additional detail: the Ministry of LNV (now LVVN) took a first step with the quick scan 'Effects of LNV instruments on nature and biodiversity' (Parliamentary letter DGNV/27398258, 29 August 2023). Together with other departments and knowledge institutions, the Ministry has had an assessment method developed to evaluate public financial incentives for their biodiversity impact. The stated intention is to begin in 2025 with greening, redirecting, and phasing out harmful elements of the Ministry's financial incentives. Close cooperation is maintained with the Nature-Inclusive Collective (Collectief Natuurinclusief). Following the initial inventory at the Ministries of LNV and the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), other government authorities can also start working with the developed assessment method. The Ministry and Collectief Natuurinclusief will also enter into discussions with the public bodies of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba regarding the use of this assessment method. Stakeholder contributions note that revision of harmful subsidies and schemes will have an impact on various sectors and individual companies, and that banks, accountants, and the financial sector need to estimate the consequences and risks in a timely manner. Accountants are flagged as important for correct and timely advice to clients who may be affected by reforms towards nature-positive subsidies.
Norway		The NBSAP situates harmful-subsidy reform against global estimates by Deutz et al. (2020) that eliminating harmful subsidies could close approximately USD 500 billion of the global annual biodiversity financing gap, underpinning KMGBF Target 18. Nationally, Norway does not have statistics on subsidies harmful to biodiversity but notes two prior mappings — one 2008 mapping of grant schemes with negative environmental impact, and the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA) mapping of grant schemes with negative biodiversity impacts in the 2020 national budget, commissioned by the Ministry of Climate and Environment. Statistics Norway (SSB) has initiated the development of statistics on environmentally harmful subsidies. The 2022 OECD Environmental Performance Review of Norway recommended that Norway should systematically screen actual and proposed subsidies (including tax provisions) to identify those not justified on financial, social and environmental grounds, develop a plan to gradually phase out funding for fossil fuel consumption and other environmentally harmful subsidies, define quantified time-bound targets, assess distributional and economic impacts, and design alternative policy to achieve the same objectives consistent with climate and environmental targets. NINA's mapping concluded that relatively few of the reviewed grant schemes have major direct negative impacts on biodiversity, while highlighting that cumulative small impacts can be significant and that biodiversity considerations should be assigned greater emphasis in scheme design.
Rwanda	By 2030, identify possible harmful incentives and subsidies that negatively impact biodiversity and scale up positive incentives to promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable use in Rwanda.	The NBSAP sets National Target 18 to identify possible harmful incentives and subsidies that negatively impact biodiversity and scale up positive incentives to promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable use by 2030. Headline indicators include the percentage of positive incentives in place and the value of subsidies harmful to biodiversity that have been eliminated, phased out, or reformed. Complementary indicators track trends in potentially harmful government agricultural support, government fossil fuel support measures, and alternatives to replace harmful subsidies. The baseline states that Rwanda has initiated a study on the identification, assessment, and redesign of subsidies with negative impacts on biodiversity, and that recommendations from this study will guide implementation. Strategic actions include raising awareness on harmful incentives and subsidies, conducting a comprehensive study for review of existing subsidies and developing a strategic plan for their gradual reduction, promoting positive incentives through financial incentives, payment for ecosystem services (PES), and certification/eco-labelling programs, and ensuring biodiversity considerations are integrated into national and sectoral budgeting and planning processes. The Aichi target assessment noted the introduction of eco-certification and sustainable agriculture incentives. The costing allocates USD 600,000.
Saudi Arabia	Enhancing positive incentives for biodiversity and reducing those that negatively affect it.	National Target 17 aims to enhance positive incentives for biodiversity and reduce those that negatively affect it. The NBSAP explicitly links this target to GBF Target 18, which concerns identifying subsidies harmful to biodiversity and their elimination or reform. The target calls for: an inventory of all subsidies and incentives harmful to biodiversity; assessing their impacts and classifying them according to national priorities; then designing and implementing national plans for their elimination. Plans will also include mechanisms to encourage positive incentives across all sectors for activities with positive biodiversity effects. The national action plan specifies: conducting a comprehensive review and assessment of current government incentives and subsidies across sectors to identify those with negative biodiversity impacts (2026–2027); developing a phased national action plan to reform harmful subsidies and apply new positive incentives, including cancelling or redirecting subsidies, tax exemptions for biodiversity-dependent farmers, and supporting green innovation (2026–2030); and establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the effectiveness of incentive reforms with periodic progress reports (2027–2030). The financial resources section reinforces this by committing to reducing incentives for unsustainable practices, particularly in agriculture and energy sectors, while providing new sustainable alternatives and strengthening positive incentives for biodiversity-friendly practices and nature-based solutions. Indicators include: quality of positive incentives, value of subsidies and harmful incentives eliminated, number of harmful subsidies identified and/or cancelled, and number of new positive incentives launched.
Sudan	Ensure that, by 2030 at the latest, incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity are identified, eliminated, phased out or reformed, starting with the most harmful, in order to minimize or avoid negative impacts, and positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity are developed and applied, consistent and in harmony with the Convention and other relevant international obligations, taking into account national socioeconomic conditions.	National Target 18 commits Sudan to identifying, eliminating, phasing out or reforming incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity by 2030, starting with the most harmful, while developing and applying positive incentives for conservation and sustainable use. Budget allocations under Goal D include US$100,000 for rangeland (1 action), US$15,300,000 for forests (4 actions), US$500,000 for wildlife (1 action), and US$450,000 for marine (2 actions). The IPLC matrix identifies an action to initiate the establishment of a trust fund to encourage local communities and the private sector to raise wild animals with economic returns and to plant productive trees to increase income, with proposals for agroforestry demonstration plots for IPLCs showcasing sustainable land use practices combining tree planting with agriculture. The monitoring framework tracks positive incentives in place for biodiversity conservation, value of subsidies and harmful incentives eliminated, phased out or reformed, trends in use of new energy sources alternative to firewood and charcoal, number of free or subsidized tree seedlings distributed, existence of policies for fishing boats and fish stock level, operational trust fund for local communities and private sector, and imposition of penalties for activities that pollute natural habitats.
Slovenia	By 2025 at the latest, incentives and subsidies with adverse effects for BD will be identified and eliminated.	The Strategic Plan sets National Objective 11: by 2025 at the latest, incentives and subsidies with adverse effects for biodiversity will be identified and eliminated. Guideline 11.1 commits to identifying and monitoring the impacts of incentives and subsidies (environmental payments) and transforming them if necessary. Measure 11.1.1 calls for abolishing or transforming adverse incentives and subsidies (MOP/MKGP), with the indicator being the amount of financial resources for incentives adverse to biodiversity. Guideline 11.2 promotes targeted payments encouraging the conservation of biodiversity, including increasing incentives for private owners to implement conservation measures in Natura 2000 areas and protected areas (11.2.1) and ensuring incentives for local breeds and varieties (11.2.2). Table 1 Measure 42 commits to monitoring the effects of subsidies on biodiversity and landscape diversity, and transforming or eliminating them where appropriate (MOP/MKGP/MZI, from 2025 onwards). The green budget reform section notes that the Government Strategic Development Project P3 has already reviewed incentives of individual ministries and assessed which have negative and positive environmental effects. Recommendations include re-updating the list of incentives, establishing a trial application of a green test, and examining the possibility of transforming existing incentives towards greening.
Senegal	Reduce subsidies harmful to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity	The NBSAP defines national target (18) as reducing subsidies harmful to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. The results framework prescribes one priority action: promotion of green taxation (indicator: number of companies benefiting from duty reductions). The resource mobilisation strategy provides further context. The polluter pays principle, introduced by the Environment Code, involves revaluation of pollution taxes on classified installations. A carbon tax project is under development to offset impacts from companies with large ecological footprints, particularly in oil and gas. Senegal is developing green taxonomy as a lever for directing financing towards environmentally positive projects. The strategy also envisions a reorientation of economic models through PPPs in the valorisation of protected areas, aiming to better preserve State and population interests.
Suriname	2.5 Suriname has set priorities for phasing out or reforming subsidies and incentives for the private sector that are harmful for biodiversity and for regulating incentives in favor of conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity including transparency and compliance.	National Target 2.5 explicitly commits Suriname to setting priorities for phasing out or reforming subsidies and incentives for the private sector that are harmful for biodiversity, and to regulating incentives in favour of conservation and sustainable use, including transparency and compliance. Action 2.5.2 commits to assessing existing private-sector incentives, including subsidies, that are harmful to biodiversity and identifying opportunities for biodiversity-positive incentives. Action 2.5.3 commits to developing and approving legal, policy and tax incentives for the private sector to minimise negative impacts on biodiversity and the environment. No quantified value of subsidies to be redirected and no specific elimination deadline are stated.
Chad		The NBSAP links Global Target 18 to National Target 3 and National Target 17. Section 6.4 states that the less significant the financial mobilisation required will be, the greater the reduction in subsidies currently harmful to biodiversity (GT 18), and that this target can be achieved through the implementation of NO 3 and NO 17. The 2011–2020 reference is insufficient funding; the 2030 target is the mobilisation of all Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs) including the World Bank, GEF and ESF for funding of all actions and measures of the Action Plan. Measures include identifying the most harmful economic and regulatory incentives for biodiversity at the national level, and developing targeted measures to eliminate or reform the most harmful incentives for conservation and restoration. Indicators are positive incentive measures in place to promote the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity (I1GT18), and the value of subsidies and other incentives harmful to biodiversity that have been eliminated, phased out or reformed (I2GT18).
Togo	Target 23 : Reduce subsidies harmful to biodiversity conservation and use by focusing on those with the greatest negative impacts on biodiversity	The NBSAP designates National Target 23 under Strategic Axis III (Sustainable Financing of Biodiversity), mapped to GBF Target 18, committing to reduce subsidies harmful to biodiversity conservation and use by focusing on those with the greatest negative impacts on biodiversity. The capacity building plan includes development of a plan to reform subsidies harmful to biodiversity, with a focus on the progressive elimination of the most damaging subsidies and their replacement with economic incentives favouring conservation and sustainable use. Training on the identification of financing harmful to biodiversity is budgeted at 45 million CFA, with MERF as responsible structure and UNDP/BIOFIN as partner. Beneficiary structures include the Ministry of Economy and Finance, MERF, and the ministries responsible for agriculture, mines, energy, and transport. The guiding principles under §97 include a reference to the elimination of activities with perverse effects and negative incentives, under principle (ix) on integration of biodiversity into national and local planning.
Thailand		The plan contains a dedicated Incentive Mechanism target (§126) that commits Thailand to 'eliminate, phase out or reform incentives, including subsidies, that are harmful to biodiversity, in a proportionate, just, fair, effective, and equitable way, while substantially and progressively reducing them throughout the plan period,' starting with the most harmful incentives and scaling up positive incentives for conservation and sustainable use. The recommended actions (§129) set out a sequenced approach: (1) identify negative incentives, including subsidies, by 2025, though this identification step should not preclude immediate action where possible; (2) eliminate, phase out, or reform negative incentives, with reform used where elimination is not possible because other sectors or groups depend on them; (3) accelerate action on incentives with the most severe negative impacts on biodiversity; and (4) scale up and create positive incentives such as public land acquisition, grant-aided conservation projects, and conservation easements. The rationale section notes that harmful subsidies cause significant damage to biodiversity through land-use and ecosystem destruction, and that the amount spent on negative incentives significantly exceeds that spent on positive measures.
Tunisia	By 2030, 30% of incentives harmful to biodiversity are eliminated	The NBSAP explicitly addresses harmful subsidies under its national target: "By 2030, 30% of incentives harmful to biodiversity are eliminated." The alignment analysis had identified Target 18 as having no equivalent in the previous NBSAP. The strategy references CBD Article 8.32 and Aichi Target 3 as precedents. Measure D5.1 proposes assessing harmful subsidies and redirecting them. Action D5.1.1 calls for identifying and assessing subsidies harmful to biodiversity across all ministries, covering subsidies, tax advantages, regulatory advantages, and taxes promoting habitat destruction, overexploitation of water/soil/fisheries, pollution, IAS introduction, and climate change effects. No precise inventory of public expenditure harmful to biodiversity currently exists in Tunisia. Action D5.1.2 proposes a public awareness platform on harmful subsidies. Action D5.1.3 proposes a multi-year plan for reducing harmful subsidies, with initial integration of funding for priority biodiversity actions. Action D5.1.5 calls for strengthening subsidies beneficial to biodiversity in sustainable agriculture, fishing, renewable energies, soil and water conservation, and biodiversity research. Action D5.1.6 aims to implement actions from the 2016 financial resource mobilisation strategy. The polluter-pays principle (D6.1.4) and conversion of harmful subsidies to beneficial ones (D6.1.5) are also proposed as supporting measures.
Vanuatu	By 2030, harmful subsidies that contribute to biodiversity loss are identified, controlled, and phased out, while positive incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use are promoted. Additional resources shall be allocated to strengthen local research capacity and ensure accessible, affordable, and locally-led research to guide policy reform.	The NBSAP commits to identifying, controlling, and phasing out harmful subsidies that contribute to biodiversity loss by 2030, while promoting positive incentives for conservation and sustainable use. Strategic Area 4 includes four national-level activities: conducting a national assessment to identify and map harmful subsidies across productive sectors (RM.01, VUV 5,000,000, short-term); developing and operationalising a national Harmful Subsidies Reform Policy, with approval by the appropriate national authority (BAC/COM) targeted by 2027 (RM.02, VUV 2,000,000, short-term); controlling and phasing out identified harmful subsidies across sectors (RM.03, VUV 20,000,000, long-term); and reviewing, designing, and implementing biodiversity-positive financial incentives, noting existing examples such as the Brenwe Hydroelectric project in Malekula with a PES component funded by ADB and the Strategic Climate Fund, and the Loru CCA's ongoing ecosystem services payment (RM.04, VUV 15,800,000, short-term). At the provincial level, Torba plans to regulate chainsaw use and prevent deforestation, and promote botanical gardens as positive alternatives. Target 18 is allocated 7 actions costing VUV 35,000,000.
Yemen	By 2030, halve the monetary value of subsidies harmful to biodiversity and promote environmentally positive incentives targeting green technologies, ecosystem-based programs, and clean and renewable energy.	The NBSAP establishes National Target 16, aligned to GBF Target 18, committing to halve the monetary value of subsidies harmful to biodiversity by 2030 and promote environmentally positive incentives targeting green technologies, ecosystem-based programs, and clean and renewable energy. Output 5.2 under Pathway 5 addresses market distortions, identifying subsidies for cheap fuels (diesel) and fertilizers as causing widespread pollution through unsustainable fertilizer use and over-abstraction of water resources. The strategy calls for removing perverse economic instruments and replacing them with environmentally friendly instruments. The sustainable agriculture target (ACT 2.5) also calls for removal of perverse agricultural subsidies and replacement with environmentally sustainable instruments. The resource mobilization section further suggests phasing out environmentally perverse subsidies and reallocating them to biodiversity conservation and restoration projects. The Action Plan includes eliminating subsidies for pumping water for qat cultivation as a specific measure. The indicative budget for market correction from distortions is US$1.22 million.
Zambia	By 2019, selected incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use are in place and applied, and the most harmful subsidies are identified and their gradual phase-out is initiated.	National Target 3 commits Zambia to having selected incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use in place and applied by 2019, with the most harmful subsidies identified and their gradual phase-out initiated. The M&E framework calls for analysing harmful subsidies, measuring their potential negative impact on biodiversity, and tracking the number of harmful subsidies analysed and measures taken. Positive incentives for conservation are also to be developed and applied, with at least one incentive per sector targeted by 2017. The Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) is referenced in the acronyms section, suggesting its relevance to subsidy discussions, though no specific harmful subsidies are named in the strategy text.
Afghanistan	Afghanistan will not address Target 18.	The NBSAP explicitly states that Afghanistan will not address Target 18. In Annex 1, the headline indicators (H18.1 positive incentives in place to promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable use; H18.2 value of subsidies and other incentives harmful to biodiversity that have been eliminated, phased out or reformed) are both marked with "None" for responsibility, cooperators, and dates.
Burkina Faso		The logical framework includes an indicator for the amount of expenditure on subsidies granted to fossil fuels, targeted to decrease from 259,311 million (2018 baseline) to 200,000 million by 2030, verified through MEMC (Ministry of Energy, Mines and Quarries) performance reports. No broader discussion of identifying or reforming biodiversity-harmful subsidies, incentive alignment, or subsidy redirection accompanies this indicator.
Benin	Encourage the annual mobilisation of financial resources and other means in favour of positive incentives for the conservation and restoration of biodiversity.	The NBSAP does not contain a dedicated programme or analysis of harmful subsidies. However, the monitoring framework addresses subsidy reform through two national objectives. National objective 11 includes component indicators on the value of subsidies and other incentive measures harmful to biodiversity that are redirected, repurposed, or eliminated. National objective 18 aims to encourage the annual mobilisation of financial resources and other means in favour of positive incentives for conservation and restoration, with a headline indicator on the value of subsidies and other incentives harmful to biodiversity that have been eliminated, phased out, or reformed. Complementary indicators include public-private support measures for agriculture potentially harmful to the environment (producer support estimate), and the number and value of public support measures in favour of fossil fuels and fossil fuel subsidies per unit of GDP (§127). The innovative financing section lists payment for ecosystem services and carbon credits among instruments, but does not address the elimination or reform of existing harmful subsidies (§116).
Belarus		The strategy's objective 15 is mapped by the NBSAP to KMGBF Targets 15 and 18. The objective commits to creating legal and economic mechanisms that incentivise rational use of natural resources and establishing economic incentives in the field of environmental protection. However, the content addresses the creation of positive incentives (best available techniques, resource-saving technologies, green procurement, attracting investors) rather than the identification, reform, or elimination of biodiversity-harmful subsidies, which is the core action of Target 18. No subsidy reform language appears in the briefing.
China		No sections were keyword-matched for Target 18, but Priority Action 26 on diversified investment and financing mechanisms contains a single sentence directly relevant: the plan states that harmful policies and measures are to be gradually reformed and phased out — specifically, 'Gradually reform and phase out policies and measures that are detrimental to biodiversity.' This addresses the core concept of the KMGBF target but provides no quantification, timeline specifics, identification of specific subsidies, or measurement framework. No dollar amounts or sectoral breakdowns are provided.
Czechia		The Strategy's pressures assessment identifies "inappropriate state subsidy policy" as a threat, noting that partial targeting of public budget support on production and economic effects may lead to maintenance of inappropriate ownership structures, continuing loss and degradation of natural habitats, and continuation of unfavourable trends in species populations. The financing section states that implementation must be based on the 'polluter pays' principle and high standards of environmental integrity. However, the Strategy does not commit to identifying, reforming, or eliminating specific biodiversity-harmful subsidies.
Germany		The NBS 2030 does not contain a specific target or commitment on identifying and reforming biodiversity-harmful subsidies. However, the strategy addresses subsidy reform indirectly through its treatment of the Common Agricultural Policy. It states that the German government's aim is to replace CAP direct payments with suitable financial support for farmers as recompense for their environmental and climate efforts, in line with the Commission on the Future of Agriculture's recommendations. The CAP excursus describes the shift from market and price support — which had caused considerable intensification of agricultural land use with adverse consequences — toward environmental conditionality and eco-schemes. Action area 16 notes that economic incentives are among the tools to be deployed for a nature-friendly economy and that biodiversity concerns must be backed by adequate funding, but does not specifically name the elimination of harmful subsidies or incentives.
Eritrea		The NBSAP does not contain a dedicated target or substantive programme on harmful subsidies. However, the updating process included a review of biodiversity expenditure and an instruction to "identify, review and prioritize biodiversity-harmful subsidies" (Scope item in §80). Component 4 of the updating process conducted a review of biodiversity expenditure and states that "no biodiversity harmful subsidies were identified." This finding effectively closes the issue within the NBSAP framework, though without presenting the methodology or evidence behind the conclusion.
European Union		The strategy does not present a systematic programme to identify and eliminate biodiversity-harmful subsidies. However, it addresses the issue through fiscal and pricing principles. The Commission commits to promoting tax systems and pricing that reflect environmental costs, including biodiversity loss, and encouraging Member States to shift the tax burden from labour to pollution, under-priced resources, and other environmental externalities. The 'user pays' and 'polluter pays' principles are invoked as tools to prevent and correct environmental degradation. Internationally, the EU commits to combating overfishing through WTO negotiations on a global agreement to ban harmful fisheries subsidies. The strategy also notes that delivering an ambitious post-2020 global framework will require phasing out of subsidies harmful to biodiversity. However, no quantified target or timetable for domestic subsidy reform is provided.
Equatorial Guinea		The ENPADIB Resource Mobilisation Strategy lists, among its objectives, the need to "Eliminate harmful incentives (cease supporting activities that affect biological diversity)" as part of the broader effort to consolidate funds and design a fundraising strategy. The NBSAP does not, however, contain a dedicated national target framed around identifying, reforming or redirecting biodiversity-harmful subsidies, nor a quantified value (the USD 500 billion/year global reduction target under global Target 18 is not echoed as a national figure).
Hungary		The NBSAP does not include a specific commitment to identify or reform biodiversity-harmful subsidies. However, the SWOT analysis identifies as an opportunity the 'mainstreaming the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services into the design of subsidy schemes' and the 'introduction of conditionality and agro-ecological subsidies for biodiversity conservation under the Common Agricultural Policy.' The SWOT also identifies as a threat that 'in the absence of compensation for lost revenue, less biodiversity-friendly but more profitable forms of farming will prevail on private property.' These references acknowledge the role of subsidy design in biodiversity outcomes but do not constitute a plan to eliminate or reform harmful subsidies.
Indonesia	National Target 20 (TN 20): Incentive reform to support biodiversity management.	Harmful subsidy reform is addressed only in positive-incentive terms. National Target 20 (TN 20): Incentive Reform to Support Biodiversity Management focuses on developing positive incentives such as fiscal tax holidays, tax allowances and VAT incentives, with the single indicator being the number of implemented policies providing positive incentives for biodiversity (1 in 2025, 1 in 2030, 1 in 2045). Mechanisms highlighted include Ecological Fiscal Transfer (EFT), Ecological-based Provincial Budget Transfer (TAPE) and Ecological-based Regency Budget Transfer (TAKE), illustrated by Central Java Governor Regulation Number 61 of 2023. The funding strategy (§192) references 'development of incentives and disincentives for activities related to biodiversity management' but does not commit to identification, phase-out or reform of harmful subsidies, and does not quantify a monetary reduction comparable to the USD 500 billion/year KMGBF target reproduced in §216. No identification inventory, elimination timeline or quantified subsidy-reform target is established.
Iceland		The NBSAP does not contain a dedicated section on identifying or reforming biodiversity-harmful subsidies. However, the topic surfaces in the consultation appendix, where commenters noted that the strategy places too much emphasis on positive subsidies without analyses of the extent of negative subsidies, and proposed identifying and limiting negative activities and subsidy payments. The policy's response states that under section A4 (Secure and prudent funding), an assessment will be made of whether activities harmful to biological diversity are being subsidised alongside the implementation of positive incentives. Specific concerns were raised about subsidies for unsustainable grazing and forestry with alien species.
Luxembourg		The NBSAP does not explicitly address the identification, reform, or elimination of biodiversity-harmful subsidies as called for by Target 18. However, two sections contain indirect references. Section 38 describes EU-level initiatives that the Interministerial Committee for Nature Protection would support at the national level, including "a taxation and pricing system reflecting environmental costs to incentivise a shift of the tax burden from labour towards pollution, undervalued resources and other environmental externalities." This framing aligns with the incentive-reform dimension of Target 18 but is presented as an EU initiative to be implemented nationally rather than a country-driven commitment. Section 67, discussing international financial engagement, cites the Paulson Institute's estimate that approximately half of the needed biodiversity expenditure could be covered by "better deployment of existing funds and smarter policy and investment choices, by shifting the flow of capital from harmful behaviours towards outcomes that benefit nature." This is a contextual framing statement rather than a specific national commitment to identify or reform harmful subsidies.
Malta		The NBSAP does not contain a dedicated target on identifying and reforming biodiversity-harmful subsidies. Action 14.1 introduces market-based instruments including economic incentives that promote the internalisation of environmental costs, fiscal instruments, and implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle. The Polluter Pays Principle is adopted as a guiding principle, holding polluters liable for environmental damage. These provisions touch on aligning economic incentives with biodiversity goals but do not specifically commit to identifying, phasing out, or reforming harmful subsidies or incentives.
Mexico — Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad de México (ENBioMex)		The alignment analysis identifies only 7% of ENBioMex actions as contributing directly to Target 18, making it one of the targets with the thinnest coverage. Axes 3 and 4 contribute the most directly, while Axes 1 and 5 contribute only in an enabling manner. Specific action lines with direct contributions include incentives and subsidies (4.2.4), policy harmonisation (4.1.4), ecological and territorial planning (4.1.5), productive reconversion (3.2.4), added value (3.2.6), and funding sources (3.3.2). The document does not discuss specific harmful subsidies to be reformed or eliminated, nor does it cite quantified targets for subsidy reform.
Malaysia		Malaysia's NPBD does not set a stand-alone target on harmful incentive reform, but the Target 6 actions on agrofood, agricommodity, fisheries, and aquaculture each commit to "redirect, reform, or eliminate perverse and harmful economic subsidies to facilitate the transition towards sustainable" production. The challenges chapter notes that overinvestment in fishing capacity (incentives or subsidies for new fishing vessels, fuel, etc.) has created perverse incentives for continued fishing despite declining fish stocks, leading to overfishing, vessel overcapitalisation, and reduced economic efficiency. No baseline valuation of harmful subsidies is given, no redirection timeline or dollar target (e.g., equivalent to the KMGBF USD 500 billion/year) is set, and no reform instrument is named. Positive-incentive scale-up appears via certification support (MPOCC, MTCC, aquaculture sustainability schemes) and through REDD Plus Finance Framework and Payment for Ecosystem Services mechanisms under Target 17. Content is present but not treated as a headline national target.
Namibia		The briefing does not contain a dedicated National Target or Programme on the identification, elimination or reform of biodiversity-harmful subsidies. The mainstreaming programme (Programme 24, National Target 14) commits in general terms to align public policies, investment frameworks and, where appropriate, fiscal and financial decision-making with biodiversity objectives, and to progressively reduce activities and financial flows that undermine biodiversity. No specific subsidy-identification exercise, redirection mechanism, or quantitative reduction commitment is described in the sections included.
Nigeria		The NBSAP's financing mechanisms table includes "Reduction of subsidies" as a financial instrument, described as: "Reduce or remove harmful subsidies, such as on fertilizers, and increase subsidies that have beneficial impacts on ecosystems." This appears in a checklist of sample financial mechanisms for NBSAP implementation alongside other instruments (tax incentives, dedicated funds, PES, biodiversity offsets). No dedicated target, timeline, or quantified commitment to subsidy reform is presented.
Paraguay		Sectoral line 3.6.8 on sustainable finance and positive incentives identifies the identification and reform of harmful incentives as one of four core components for the 2030 framework, alongside the design of new financial and regulatory instruments, improvement of existing mechanisms and mobilisation of national and international resources. The sectoral line notes that reform of harmful incentives requires complex cross-sectoral processes that must be fair, gradual and technically grounded, and that there is a lack of capacities to identify and reform harmful incentives together with limited data for evidence-based decision-making. Chapter 6 states that Global Target 19 (as referenced in the NBSAP) emphasises the need to reduce harmful incentives, improve transparency of environmental spending and strengthen economic mechanisms that promote sustainability; Paraguay's Financial Strategy for Biodiversity is to contribute directly to this commitment using the BIOFIN methodology, which includes review of regulatory and institutional frameworks. The briefing does not include a quantified national target or timeline specifically for eliminating or reforming a defined value of biodiversity-harmful subsidies.
Sweden		The NBSAP addresses target 18 through a single reference: Sweden reports environmentally harmful subsidies to the EU, and the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency develops material for Sweden's reporting of environmentally harmful subsidies to the European Commission based on the Commission's guidance; this work is stated to contribute to target 18. No commitments or quantified targets for identification, elimination, phase-out or reform of harmful subsidies by 2030 are provided.
El Salvador — NBSAP Country Page		KMGBF Target 18 (environmental incentives and disincentives) is listed as an associated global target under National Target 7. The indicator framework adopts KMGBF headline indicator 18.1 (positive incentives established to promote conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity), and tracks the amount of public and private funding mobilised from the Environmental Incentives Programme, disaggregated by source. The baseline notes no data on funding mobilised from the Incentives Programme. The Environmental Incentives and Disincentives Programme established credit, management and payment for environmental services incentives to induce good production practices that favour ecosystem rehabilitation. Challenges include 'review of tariffs and enforcement of penalties for environmental offences' and 'effective implementation of environmental compensation mechanisms.' The alignment analysis identifies the need to develop more attractive incentives and to guarantee the application of the Environmental Compensation and Incentives Programme. However, the NBSAP does not address the reform or elimination of biodiversity-harmful subsidies as specified by KMGBF Target 18. The content focuses on positive incentives and compensation rather than subsidy reform.
Uganda		National target 7.1 ("By 2025, a biodiversity finance plan is developed and operationalized") is mapped to KMGBF Target 18 alongside Target 19. The ecological fiscal reform section (§184) describes measures including taxes on natural resource extraction, product subsidy and tax reforms, taxes on polluting emissions, and user charges. It states that fiscal instruments should be effective at reducing environmental harm, cost-effective, and strike the right balance between environmental benefits and economic costs. The NBSAP notes that charge systems in Uganda are used as permits and include pollution charges, user charges for wetlands, betterment charges, impact fees, and access fees. However, the NBSAP does not identify specific biodiversity-harmful subsidies to be reformed or eliminated, nor does it set a quantified subsidy reduction target. The treatment is at the level of fiscal reform principles rather than a concrete subsidy reform agenda.
Australia
Belgium
Côte d'Ivoire
Panama
State of Palestine
Viet Nam