Target 17: Biosafety
Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework
Generated: 2026-04-19T20:28:19Z
Landscape
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety — which governs the transboundary movement of living modified organisms (LMOs) through risk assessment, advance informed agreement, and the Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH) — provides the normative frame for nearly every national commitment among the 52 countries that explicitly address this target. Within that shared vocabulary, regulatory development spans a wide range: from countries that enumerate compliance per indicator to countries whose national biosafety law has not yet entered into force or whose implementing decrees remain outstanding. The dual mandate of GBF Target 17 — risk governance under CBD Article 8(g) and biotechnology benefit-sharing under Article 19 — is reflected unevenly; most plans foreground risk management, while a smaller subset explicitly pairs the two domains. Uganda's NBSAP illustrates the breadth of domestic conditions that "implementing the Cartagena Protocol" can encompass: the country operates five crops with nine plant novel traits under Confined Field Trials across three regions, with "locally developed improved varieties of bananas, cotton, maize and cassava anticipated to be ready for open release in the next 5-10 years," while a national biosafety law has not yet been enacted. Eight countries return no Target 17 content in the dataset — a gap that may reflect extraction limits rather than policy silence.
Variation
The most visible axis of variation is Cartagena Protocol status. The Netherlands and Germany report full, long-standing compliance. Vanuatu is still working toward accession, with its "accession instrument targeted for signature by June 2026" — one of very few countries in the dataset at that stage, though Vanuatu has costed 20 biosafety actions totalling VUV 97,000,000 in anticipation. Canada occupies a distinct position: a G7 economy and CBD party that has not ratified the Protocol, with its NBSAP committing to "undertake an analysis of Canada's potential ratification of the Cartagena Protocol" while noting that its existing Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA, 1999) applies to all living organisms whether genetically modified or not.
Positions on GMO cultivation range from constitutional prohibition to science-based permitting to precautionary non-commencement. Hungary's NBSAP states that "Hungary treats GMO-free agriculture as a strategic issue of utmost importance, enshrined in the Fundamental Law," accompanied by a GMO-free food trademark system certified by the Food Chain Security Center Nonprofit Ltd. Slovenia maintains a prohibition on GMO cultivation under its Strategic Plan. Bhutan's position is broader: the "Biosafety Act of Bhutan 2015 prohibits any activity involving GMOs in reproducible form," covering all activities involving GMOs in reproductive form, not cultivation alone — with the NBSAP's two forward actions being initiation of Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol ratification and revision of the Act itself. Iran commits to "legally prohibit the cultivation of any transgenic products on Iranian lands, per the 7th FYDP," while Zambia applies a precautionary approach under which no GMO cultivation has commenced.
Regulatory maturity ranges from long-established frameworks to legally vacant spaces now being addressed. Senegal enacted a dedicated biosafety law in 2022; Rwanda's Biosafety Law dates to 2024; Cameroon references a 2025 national biosafety law pending implementing decrees; Tunisia acknowledges a draft biosafety law not yet adopted. Equatorial Guinea acknowledges an explicit legal vacuum on modern biotechnology products, and the Marshall Islands names an active Cartagena Protocol compliance deficit with a remediation timeline.
Quantification depth differs sharply. Burkina Faso's action plan specifies: "6,000 people to receive information and awareness sessions on biotechnology/biosafety (2,000 per year), 02 GMO use authorisation files to be evaluated, 32 inspections on GMO use sites and during transboundary movements (10–12 per year), and 36 biosafety product controls (12 per year)," all State-funded through the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Innovation (MESRI). Cameroon sets a laboratory localisation target of "at least 80% of LMO/GMO analyses carried out locally (from baseline of approximately 25%)." Indonesia tracks escalating numeric targets for biosafety-certified genetically engineered products through 2045. Most other plans commit to strengthening or operationalising without quantified baselines.
A minority of NBSAPs extend governance explicitly to synthetic biology, gene editing, and gene drives. China, Canada, Malaysia, and Vanuatu name synthetic biology within their risk-assessment scope; Japan applies a 2019 genome-editing notification scheme under which genome-edited organisms without introduced foreign genetic material fall outside the Cartagena Act's LMO framework; Iran commits to specific gene drive provisions. Brazil links biosafety explicitly to traditional and ancestral knowledge, with its national target text "recognising the importance of traditional and ancestral knowledge in biotechnology and the fair distribution of its benefits as provided for in Article 19 of the Convention." Institutional architecture ranges from countries planning entirely new biosafety bodies — Cameroon plans a dedicated national body distinct from its existing advisory committee; Eritrea plans a national management body by 2027 — to those maintaining and updating existing institutions such as India's Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) and Uganda's National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST).
Standouts
Afghanistan is the sole country in the dataset to explicitly decline to address Target 17 with a stated rationale. Its NBSAP records: "Afghanistan will not address Target 17. Biotechnology is not a significant threat to Afghanistan relative to other more pressing issues." All Target 17 indicator fields in the NBSAP's Annex 1 are marked None. The declination illustrates that under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, the target is in practice optional — a country may name its reasons and assign no actions.
Canada occupies a singular position among G7 economies and CBD parties: it has not ratified the Cartagena Protocol. Rather than committing to ratification, the NBSAP commits to "undertake an analysis of Canada's potential ratification of the Cartagena Protocol" — a formulation that preserves the distinction between study and action. Canada notes that its existing CEPA framework applies to all living organisms whether genetically modified or not, and separately commits to horizon scanning on synthetic biology and artificial intelligence in LMO development.
The Marshall Islands is the sole country in the dataset whose NBSAP names an active Cartagena Protocol compliance deficit and sets a remediation timeline. The NBSAP records that "MoNRC to submit a compliance action plan to regain compliance status under the Cartagena Protocol (timeline: before June 2026; responsible: MoNRC)," alongside an update of the 2006 National Biosafety Framework legislative review. The small-island-state context — in which transboundary LMO movement controls depend heavily on port-entry capacity — shapes the remediation priorities.
The Netherlands enumerates compliance across each complementary GBF indicator for the European part of its territory, asserting that "the European part of the Netherlands has for years already been compliant with Action Target 17." The same NBSAP notes an internal territorial carve-out: the Cartagena Protocol does not yet apply to Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba (the Caribbean Netherlands), and the government commits to examining how implementation can be extended to those islands.
Hungary's NBSAP states that "Hungary treats GMO-free agriculture as a strategic issue of utmost importance, enshrined in the Fundamental Law." Constitutional entrenchment of GMO-free status is rare globally. The implementation instrument is a GMO-free food trademark system administered by the Food Chain Security Center Nonprofit Ltd. The same NBSAP notes that more than 130 new genomic technique (NGT) contained-use activities are running in approximately 100 facilities, and identifies increased oversight of these activities as necessary given the absence of information on environmental release impacts — a governance horizon that the GMO-cultivation prohibition does not itself address.
Analysis
The Cartagena Protocol functions as the near-universal normative anchor for this target, but protocol membership does not predict operational biosafety capacity. Some long-standing parties still lack enacted implementing legislation or functional risk-assessment laboratories; at least one non-party — Canada — operates a mature regulatory system predating potential ratification. Across the dataset, "party to the Protocol" and "operationally compliant with its obligations" describe substantially different states.
The GBF target's pairing of Article 8(g) risk governance with Article 19 biotechnology benefit-sharing is reflected unevenly. Countries with significant genetic resource endowments or active biotechnology research sectors — Brazil, Namibia, Thailand, the Democratic Republic of the Congo — explicitly link the two domains within their biosafety commitments. Many others treat benefit-sharing as belonging to the Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS)/Target 13 domain, leaving the Article 19 dimension of Target 17 largely unaddressed in the biosafety sections of their plans.
Emerging biotechnology governance — synthetic biology, gene editing, gene drives — appears in a distinct minority of NBSAPs, mostly from countries with existing advanced biotech sectors or research institutions. Iran presents an unusual pairing: a commitment to "legally prohibit the cultivation of any transgenic products on Iranian lands, per the 7th FYDP" alongside an explicit acknowledgement that the country currently lacks specific regulations governing synthetic biology, and a commitment to govern gene drives specifically. The majority of countries are silent on these categories, and the Cartagena Protocol framework, designed around first-generation GMOs, does not compel attention to them.
A recurring structural pattern — visible most explicitly in countries such as Cameroon, Tunisia, and El Salvador — is the gap between legal framework adoption and operational implementation. The NBSAPs that quantify this gap most precisely, expressing it in laboratory accreditation rates, inspection frequencies, trained-personnel counts, and the share of analyses conducted domestically, make the transition from statute to functioning system measurable. The distance between having a biosafety law and having an operational biosafety regime is the operative challenge this target poses across the majority of the dataset.
Per-country detail
Ordered by classification (explicitly_addresses → relevant_to → not_identified) then alphabetically by country name.
| Country | National Target | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Argentina | Before 2030, strengthen existing biosafety measures for products of modern biotechnology, in order to anticipate possible risks and negative impacts using the best available methodology, as established in Article 8(g) of the CBD, as well as those that promote their use and the distribution of their benefits. | National Target 17 commits to strengthening existing biosafety measures for products of modern biotechnology before 2030, in order to anticipate possible risks and negative impacts using the best available methodology, as established in Article 8(g) of the CBD. The target also calls for promoting the use of biotechnology products and the distribution of their benefits. No additional detailed implementation measures for this target appear in the briefing sections beyond the national target text. The rationale for Axis 4 notes that biotechnology development contributed to the transformation of the traditional agricultural production model. |
| Belgium | The NBSAP addresses biosafety through multiple operational objectives covering GMOs in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry, plus dedicated research provisions. Operational objective 4c.7 aims to prevent cultivated GMOs from leading to loss, displacement, or genetic introgression into local agricultural varieties and related wild flora, and from affecting surrounding natural biodiversity. The Strategy calls for case-by-case environmental risk studies and socio-economic consideration of GMO introduction in Belgium. Operational objective 4d.3 addresses GM fish, noting that GM varieties have been commercialised elsewhere with risks of threatening wild species through reproductive contact. The Belgian Marine Environmental law prohibits deliberate introduction of genetically modified organisms in marine areas. Objective 4f.4 covers GM trees, noting they are not allowed in certified forests. The Strategy references EU GMO evaluation and authorisation regulations, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and calls for scrupulous respect of these frameworks. Under operational objective 7.8, Belgium commits to promoting research on effects of GMOs and products of synthetic biology on biodiversity, including methodologies to predict invasive behaviour and reduce transgene transfer probability. Post-release monitoring is called for at community and ecosystem levels, not just individual species. Socio-economic studies on GMO culture impacts are to be undertaken as encouraged by Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol. | |
| Burkina Faso | The NBSAP addresses biosafety through a layered legal framework and specific operational actions. Burkina Faso ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2003) and the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress (2018). National legislation includes Law No. 064-2012/AN on the Biosafety Regime for Biotechnology, which regulates the development, experimentation, production, dissemination, storage, importation, exportation, and transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms, requiring containment measures for risk assessment before any intentional release. At the regional level, the ECOWAS Regulation on the Prevention of Biotechnological Risks (2020) establishes a legal and institutional framework for biotechnology risk management. Action 2.1.1.3 (Promotion of modern biotechnologies) combines biotechnology development with biosafety safeguards. Activities include producing improved plant and forest seed varieties, artificial insemination of cows, and developing productivity-enhancing technologies, alongside awareness-raising on biotechnology/biosafety, GMO site inspections, and transboundary movement controls. The 2025–2027 action plan quantifies biosafety activities: 6,000 people to receive information and awareness sessions on biotechnology/biosafety (2,000 per year), 02 GMO use authorisation files to be evaluated, 32 inspections on GMO use sites and during transboundary movements (10–12 per year), and 36 biosafety product controls (12 per year). All are funded by the State through MESRI. The strategy identifies strengthening national capacities in biotechnological risk assessment and management as a priority challenge. | |
| Brazil | Strengthen, by 2030, the capacity to implement biosafety measures in the development and use of biotechnologies, within the framework of the National Biosafety Policy, in line with Article 8(g) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and measures for handling biotechnology, recognising the importance of traditional and ancestral knowledge in biotechnology and the fair distribution of its benefits as provided for in Article 19 of the Convention. This includes alignment with the National Technical Biosafety Commission (CTNBio), in accordance with the Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, maintaining public support for scientific research on the impacts of biotechnologies and for capacity-building on best practices in biosafety; and promoting the maintenance of the genetic integrity of biodiversity, including that of wild relatives, and the physical integrity of seeds of traditional varieties and breeds. | The NBSAP establishes National Target 17, committing to strengthen by 2030 the capacity to implement biosafety measures in the development and use of biotechnologies, within the framework of the National Biosafety Policy and in line with Article 8(g) of the CBD. The target addresses the handling of biotechnology and recognises the importance of traditional and ancestral knowledge in biotechnology and the fair distribution of its benefits as provided under Article 19 of the Convention. The target specifies alignment with the National Technical Biosafety Commission (CTNBio), maintenance of public support for scientific research on biotechnology impacts and capacity-building on biosafety best practices, and promotion of the genetic integrity of biodiversity, including wild relatives, and the physical integrity of seeds of traditional varieties and breeds. The Academia Workshop participants recommended conducting long-term studies with periodic assessments of the impacts of genetically modified organisms on biodiversity. Brazil's legal framework includes biosafety rules from Law No. 11,105 of March 2005, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted in 2003 to address safe handling of GMOs. Synergies are identified with the Cartagena Protocol, the International Health Regulations, and the World Organisation for Animal Health. |
| Bhutan | By 2030, strengthen implementation of biosafety measures | Bhutan's National Target 17 states: "By 2030, strengthen implementation of biosafety measures," aligned with KMGBF Target 17. Bhutan acceded to the Cartagena Protocol in September 2003 and enacted the Biosafety Act of Bhutan 2015, which prohibits any activity involving GMOs in reproducible form. The Bhutan Food and Drug Authority serves as the National Focal Point for the Cartagena Protocol. One strategy with two actions is identified: initiating ratification of the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress by Parliament, and initiating revision of the Biosafety Act of Bhutan 2015. The NBSAP identifies challenges including limited capacity for risk assessment and monitoring, inadequate public awareness, insufficient GMO detection capacities, and the absence of a liability and redressal mechanism. The rapid pace of biotechnological innovation, particularly synthetic biology and gene drives, is noted as presenting challenges that current regulatory frameworks may be ill-equipped to handle. Capacity-building interventions include training on sampling, detection, quantification, and risk management of GMOs, the Biosafety Clearing House, and CRISPR-Cas9 technology. |
| Belarus | Ensuring the functioning of national mechanisms for ensuring biosafety (Cartagena Protocol). | The strategy's objective 13 is jointly mapped to KMGBF Targets 13 and 17, covering both access and benefit-sharing and biosafety. The biosafety components commit to ensuring the functioning of national mechanisms on biosafety matters under the Cartagena Protocol. Belarus acceded to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety pursuant to Law No. 97-З of 6 May 2002. The Law on the Safety of Genetic Engineering Activities (No. 96-З) was adopted on 9 January 2006. The strategy's goals include ensuring the safe movement, use, and release into the environment of genetically engineered organisms that do not cause damage to biological diversity. The state governance chapter describes a national clearing-house mechanism on biosafety matters. The National Action Plan includes ensuring the functioning of the expert council on the safety of genetically engineered organisms (item 5, 2026–2030), assigned to the Ministry of Natural Resources. |
| Canada | Canadian legislation and regulations governing products of biotechnology — including the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (CEPA) — provide a science-based framework applying to living organisms whether genetically modified or not. Canada uses a sectoral approach, with specific departments overseeing agriculture and food, pest management, safe use of pathogens/toxins, and environment/human health. Recent guidance updates related to foods and plants with novel traits (Food and Drugs Act, Seeds Act) reflect ongoing regulatory review. ECCC and HC are undertaking a planned regulatory review and will propose amendments to the New Substances Notification Regulations (Organisms) to address issues identified in the CEPA update by early 2025, and will publish an updated context-dependent microbial risk assessment framework in 2024. HC is considering the Council of Canadian Academies' 2023 independent assessment on gene-edited organisms for pest control. Canada collaborates with OECD Secretariat and Member countries on biosafety consensus documents. The federal government commits to conduct a gap analysis of biosafety priorities within biotechnology research, undertake an analysis of Canada's potential ratification of the Cartagena Protocol, pursue participation in horizon scanning in synthetic biology and AI for LMO development, proactively share information with stakeholders on biosafety approaches and regulatory decisions, and enhance communication and capacity-building efforts including stakeholder engagement strategy, compliance promotion, and public webinars. | |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | By 2030, legal, technical and administrative measures, aligned with the national biosafety framework, are taken and implemented to prevent biotechnological risks, responsibly manage products derived from modern biotechnology, and guarantee a fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their use, while promoting capacity building, the development of research, innovation and education in the field of biotechnologies, and the application of biosafety measures. | Objective 17 commits the DRC to legal, technical and administrative measures aligned with the national biosafety framework by 2030, to prevent biotechnological risks, responsibly manage products derived from modern biotechnology, and ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits from their use. The objective supports capacity building, research, innovation and education in biotechnology, and the application of biosafety measures under the Cartagena Protocol. The estimated budget is USD 6 million. |
| Republic of the Congo | Target 18/17: By 2030 at the latest, take political, administrative and legal measures relating to biotechnological safety provided for in Article 8(g) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Convention sur la diversité biologique), as well as measures relating to the management of biotechnologies and the sharing of their benefits provided for in Article 19 thereof. | National Target 18/17 commits by 2030 to take political, administrative and legal measures relating to biotechnological safety provided for in Article 8(g) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as measures relating to the management of biotechnologies and the sharing of their benefits provided for in Article 19. Result A4O18R18 contains four actions: development of a legal framework relating to biotechnology and biosafety (laws and implementing texts); capacity building of officials in relevant public administrations on biotechnology and biosafety legislation and regulations; development of a national nomenclature of biotechnological products; and creation of a laboratory for analysing environmental parameters (soils, air and water including resulting products). Indicators include availability of the law and implementing texts establishing biotechnological safety measures in the Republic of the Congo, number of officials trained per relevant administration and NGO/association in the biosafety framework, existence of the product nomenclature, number of biotechnology products detected or identified during inspections, and existence of the environmental parameter analysis laboratory. Responsible bodies include ministries for scientific research, the environment, trade, health, agriculture, higher education, forests, sustainable development, finance (Customs), the interior, and commerce, with local authorities. Timelines and budget figures are not stated in the extracted table for these actions. |
| Côte d'Ivoire | The NBSAP addresses biosafety through two operational objectives. Under Objective 10 (agriculture), the strategy commits to ensuring that the use of Genetically Modified Organisms does not lead to degradation, displacement, or genetic introgression of local agricultural varieties and surrounding wild biodiversity. It notes that transgenic organism use in Ivorian agriculture has not been confirmed but that various projects exist, requiring case-by-case environmental and socio-economic impact studies before any introduction. Specific measures include strict compliance with existing procedures, a monitoring and evaluation system for transgenic plant impacts on biodiversity, a strategy for ex situ conservation of local varieties as a safeguard, training of resident agents for managing unofficial introductions, and farmer awareness about risks of transgenic seed exchange from neighbouring countries. Under Objective 12 (fisheries), the strategy addresses genetically modified fish: while their presence has not been certified, growing global commercialisation raises concerns about crossbreeding and competition with local species. Measures include strengthened control of live species introduced for aquaculture, aquariums, or research, investigations to identify transgenic specimens, and publication of specific guidelines. | |
| Chile | By 2030, there is a diagnosis of the risks and benefits of the application of modern biotechnology techniques that may impact the country's biodiversity | The NBSAP establishes national target IV.35 requiring a diagnosis of the risks and benefits of modern biotechnology techniques that may impact the country's biodiversity by 2030. The gap analysis acknowledges that Target 17 was among the KMGBF targets lacking a corresponding national biodiversity target in the previous NBS. No linked instruments are identified for this target. |
| Cameroon | The NBSAP addresses biosafety through a dedicated institutional body and three national objectives spanning operational capacity, legislative implementation and sustainable financing. The National Biosafety Committee (Comite national de biosecurite), created by Order No. 035/CAB/PM of 30 January 2012 under MINEPDED, serves as the advisory body responsible for issuing opinions on matters relating to the prevention of biotechnological risks. Its 18 enumerated responsibilities include: ensuring compliance with international biosafety conventions; developing and disseminating information on GMO/LMO risks; promoting public awareness, education and participation in GMO/LMO safety; developing emergency intervention strategies for accidental releases; defining packaging, labelling and marketing standards for GMO/LMO products; defining laboratory, industrial and production safety practices; processing applications for advance informed agreement or prior informed consent for import/export of GMOs; processing applications for trials in open and confined environments; preparing risk assessment reports for the Competent National Authority; issuing opinions on risk assessment and management methods; designating and certifying expert laboratories for quality verification testing; participating in post-release monitoring; and proposing measures including withdrawal of approval or destruction of GMOs/LMOs. Objective 11 strengthens biotechnological risk prevention measures. Action 11.1 builds capacity for effective management of LMOs/GMOs through seven activities: organising three training sessions (national, regional and local) on detection, diagnosis and surveillance, targeting at least 75% management effectiveness (from a baseline of approximately 35%); providing LMO analysis and detection kits at entry points, targeting 10-40 LMOs detected/intercepted per year (from 0-3); identifying and equipping laboratories for LMO/GMO detection, targeting at least 80% of analyses carried out locally (from approximately 25%); developing at least 3 biosafety/biotechnological risk prevention curricula for primary, secondary and higher education (from 0); developing at least 6 national guidelines/protocols covering LMO/GMO risk assessment and management by 2030 (from approximately 2); training at least 2,500 stakeholders in biosafety and biotechnological risk prevention by 2030 (from approximately 200); and training at least 1,200 risk assessors, risk managers and inspectors by 2030 (from approximately 190). Objective 21 strengthens the institutional and operational framework for biotechnological risk prevention. Action 21.1 implements the legislative, regulatory and institutional framework through four activities: implementing the 2025 national law on biosafety with at least 5 implementing decrees covering authorisation, risks, control and ABS (from 0); establishing risk assessment and management procedures for LMOs targeting at least 90% of applications processed within regulatory deadlines (from 30-40%); developing a liability and compensation framework for biotechnological damages (from no existing framework); and establishing a new dedicated national body for biosafety through a legal text (from no existing body). Action 21.2 defines and establishes sustainable financing for biosafety, targeting more than 50% real increase in the national budget allocated to biotechnological risk prevention, 8-10 active public-private partnerships supporting biosafety (from 0-2), 5-8 million USD cumulative mobilised through international cooperation (from 0.5-1 million USD), and 8-10 formal cooperation agreements (from 2-3). Objective 12 addresses capacity building in conservation, biosafety, genetic resources and digital sequencing, including the development of an integrated national capacity-building plan and promotion of applied research and technology transfer. The capacity building plan references training sectoral stakeholders in biosafety alongside other thematic areas. | |
| China | The NBSAP addresses biosafety through Priority Action 12 and supporting regulatory and research measures. The strategic tasks section specifically calls for strengthening the national biosafety coordination mechanism, improving the technical support system for environmental risk assessment and regulation of biotechnology, and guarding against the risk of genetic resource loss. Priority Action 12 requires tracking and monitoring the impacts of biotechnology products such as genetically modified organisms on the ecological environment, improving the technical system for detection, evaluation, monitoring, and risk prevention of environmental release of biotechnology products, and developing precise detection and rapid screening technologies for emerging biotechnology products. The plan calls for constructing environmental risk assessment models and indicator systems for such products. A dedicated priority project focuses on emerging biotechnology products including gene editing and synthetic biology, requiring development of key technologies for risk identification, monitoring, and safety evaluation, and construction of a technical system for environmental safety risk identification based on the full life cycle. Classification, identification, prediction, analysis, and assessment of environmental release risks are required based on biological attributes, molecular manipulation characteristics, and application scenarios. The Biosafety Law is referenced as already promulgated. The policy and regulatory framework section calls for strengthening the catalogue and management system for invasive alien species. Scientific research and equipment development in biotechnology environmental safety is designated as a priority. Benefit-sharing from biotechnology is addressed through the ABS framework (see Target 13), including the Regulation on Access to Biological Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing under preparation. | |
| Germany | Up to and beyond 2030, Germany will continue to fulfil its obligations under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the requirements of the Implementation Plan and the Capacity-building Action Plan. | Target 20.5 of the NBS 2030 commits Germany to continuing to fulfil its obligations under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the requirements of the Implementation Plan and Capacity-building Action Plan adopted at COP-MOP 10 in 2022, which were anchored in GBF Target 17. Germany signed the Cartagena Protocol in May 2000 and ratified it via the Cartagena Protocol Act in November 2003. The Protocol is intended to ensure that the environment and human health are protected when living modified organisms are transferred across borders, handled, or used. The Annex I indicators include a target on the precautionary principle in genetic engineering and synthetic biology (Target 8.9). The indicator on genetic engineering in agriculture records the total size of cultivation areas of genetically modified plants. The strategy notes that cultivation of genetically modified agricultural crops does not currently take place in Germany, and no genetically modified organisms have been released since 2012. The indicator is suspended until further notice. An additional indicator on the proportion of monitoring plans for GMOs that address differentiated environmental monitoring is to be developed, as is one on GMO imports. |
| Denmark | Denmark and the EU have acceded to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which sets rules for cross-border transfers and the handling and use of live genetically modified organisms (GMOs). A key stipulation is that live GMOs may not be transferred across national borders without the prior informed consent of the competent authority of the recipient country, implemented in EU legislation through Regulation 1946/2003. The EU and Denmark have comprehensive GMO regulation which, in accordance with the precautionary principle, aims to protect human health and the environment in connection with the release of GMOs, whether as trial releases on a defined area or through marketing. Denmark has adopted additional legislation on the coexistence of GMOs and other crops, and on compensation for losses. These rules regulate coexistence between genetically modified crops and conventional and organic farming, ensuring that neighbouring farmers do not suffer losses from GMO incorporation, and providing for compensation if incorporation occurs. | |
| Egypt | By 2030, take actions and measures, including the issuance of national biosafety legislation, taking into account risk assessment to avoid negative impacts on biodiversity | The NBSAP sets a national target of taking actions and measures by 2030, including the issuance of national biosafety legislation, taking risk assessment into account to avoid negative impacts on biodiversity. Egypt is identified as a party to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, ratified in 2003. A National Biosafety Committee has been formed to oversee activities related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs), assess potential risks, and ensure compliance with legislation, while regulatory bodies conduct risk assessments before permitting GMO use. Implementation steps include: developing and implementing an effective legal and regulatory framework covering import, export, and use of GMOs; updating the Egyptian Biosafety Law to comply with Cartagena and other international standards; developing risk-assessment mechanisms covering biodiversity, agriculture, human health, and the environment; establishing oversight and inspection units across sectors using GMOs; building national capacities through training experts, scientists, and officials; establishing specialised research and development centres to study environmental and social GMO impacts; establishing strict regulatory systems for GMO use in major agricultural crops; creating permanent monitoring systems tracking GMOs in use or trade with long-term impact assessment; implementing rapid-response procedures for unexpected negative effects; funding biosafety research; establishing a strict management system for biotechnology waste (agricultural and laboratory); and conducting periodic assessments of biosafety policies. Challenges cited are lack of public awareness, funding, and the need for strengthened international cooperation. |
| Eritrea | Target 13: By 2030, the capacity of biosafety and biotechnology techniques strengthened, the negative impacts of LMOs minimized and measures for the handling of biosafety and biotechnology risks implemented. | Eritrea's National Target 13 commits to strengthening biosafety and biotechnology capacity, minimizing negative impacts of living modified organisms (LMOs), and implementing measures for handling biosafety and biotechnology risks by 2030, with a total budget of USD 930,000. The NBSAP frames biosafety measures as necessary to regulate, manage, and control risks associated with the use and release of LMOs, while acknowledging that new biotechnological developments such as digital sequencing and molecular tools provide opportunities alongside increased concerns about potential adverse effects on the environment and human health. The action plan includes assessing the status of biosafety, biotechnology, and risks of transgenic products at the national level (Action 13.1.1, 2026-2027, USD 100,000), assessing the implementation status of the national biosafety framework (Action 13.1.2), empowering biosafety-relevant institutes for supervision and handling of transgenic products (Action 13.1.3), and conducting training on the Biosafety Clearing House (Action 13.2.1, 2027-2028, USD 50,000). Public awareness on modern biotechnology, biosafety, and GMOs/LMOs is planned (Action 13.2.2). Capacity building measures include developing human capacity in molecular and genotyping techniques and handling of modern biotechnology products (Action 13.3.1, 2027-2029, USD 250,000) and strengthening/upgrading national laboratories for modern biotechnology, digital sequencing, and genotyping (Action 13.3.3, 2027-2028, USD 350,000). Institutional measures include establishing a national management body for biosafety (Action 13.4.1, 2027), establishing a National Biosafety Database (Action 13.4.2, 2027-2030), and updating operational guidelines for biosafety (Action 13.4.3, 2027). |
| Gabon | Strengthen biosafety and distribute the benefits of biotechnology | Gabon's National Target 17 commits to strengthening biosafety and distributing the benefits of biotechnology. The strategic action is to develop and adopt the national legal and regulatory framework, with law and regulatory texts as the key indicator. MEEC and the Ministry of Agriculture are the responsible stakeholders. Gabon is a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity and its protocols, including the Cartagena Protocol on the prevention of biotechnological risks. The Cartagena Protocol has a designated national focal point (Dr Jean Bruno Mikissa). The monitoring and evaluation system will feed the Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH) of the Cartagena Protocol. Specific action plans for CBD protocols, including biosafety, are planned within the operational framework. |
| United Kingdom | The UK will establish, strengthen capacity for, and implement biosafety measures as set out in Article 8(g) of the Convention on Biological Diversity and measures for the handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits as set out in Article 19 of the Convention. | The NBSAP sets UK target 17, committing to establish, strengthen capacity for, and implement biosafety measures as set out in Article 8(g) of the Convention on Biological Diversity and measures for the handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits as set out in Article 19 of the Convention. |
| Equatorial Guinea | By 2030, develop a law on the use and management of genetically modified organisms, establish an Emergency Measures Plan for accidents arising from the use of modern biotechnology products, and ensure the equitable sharing of benefits. | National Target 17 commits, by 2030, to develop a law on the use and management of genetically modified organisms, establish an Emergency Measures Plan for accidents arising from the use of modern biotechnology products, and ensure the equitable sharing of benefits. The strategy recommends ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and frames the national approach around Strengthening biotechnology governance through creation of legal frameworks, detection laboratories and technical training programmes for biological risk assessment and management. Implementation conditions include drafting and approval of the National Biosafety and Biotechnology Law, creation of a national reference laboratory for detection of modified organisms, establishment of a National Biosafety Committee for scientific and technical decision-making, and integration into the CBD Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH). A budget line of USD 2,000,000 is attached in §244 for biotechnology market access study. The briefing notes that there is a legal vacuum regarding modern biotechnology products in the country, that biotechnology is currently used mainly in DNA paternity testing, and that UNGE hosts agricultural biotechnology research laboratories. Degree of alignment with global Target 17 is HIGH. |
| Hungary | The NBSAP designates Objective 7 as ensuring that the release of genetically modified organisms (GMO) into the environment does not threaten biodiversity. Hungary treats GMO-free agriculture as a strategic issue of utmost importance, enshrined in the Fundamental Law. No genetically modified crops have ever been cultivated in Hungary, and a full prohibition on GM plant cultivation is in force. Seed production, export, and import are subject to strict control, and authorities enforce mandatory labelling and strict GMO-testing of imported food and feed products. The Ministry of Agriculture introduced a GMO-free food trademark system, with certification performed by the Food Chain Security Center Nonprofit Ltd. Several companies have been certified and GMO-free labelled products have appeared on the market. On new genomic techniques (NGTs), more than 130 NGT-related contained-use activities are conducted in approximately 100 facilities in Hungary, most involving basic research. The NBSAP notes that increased control of these activities is necessary, as no information is available on the impact of their release into the environment. The strategy also addresses risks from approximately 100 contained-use facilities for gene technology and the detection of illegal genetically modified animals (ornamental fish, GM salmon) on EU markets. Funding is identified from budgetary funds and international/private sources. | |
| Indonesia | National Target 14 (TN 14): Strengthening capacity for biosafety management. | National Target 14 (TN 14): Strengthening Capacity for Biosafety Management operationalises the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, ratified by Law Number 21 of 2004 and implemented through Government Regulation Number 21 of 2005 on Biosafety of Genetically Engineered Products. Biosafety and biosecurity of genetically engineered products in Indonesia cover environmental safety, food safety and feed safety. The Indonesian Biosafety Clearing House (KKH PRG) reported a peak of 17 biosafety certificates for food, feed and environment in 2020. TN 14 is measured by two indicators: number of biotechnology applications derived from bioprospecting that are utilised (targets of 30 in 2025, 40 in 2030, 70 in 2045) and number of genetically engineered products with biosafety certification (baseline 17 in 2020; 8 in 2023; targets 20 in 2025, 40 in 2030, 100 in 2045). TN 14 is delivered through three action groups: strengthening institutional frameworks for biosafety management; utilisation of modern biotechnology consistent with biosafety principles; and enhancing biosafety management facilities. Lead entities are BRIN, Kemendiktisaintek, Kementan, Barantin, KLH/BPLH, Kemenhut, the National Agency of Drug and Food Control (BPOM), Kemenkes, National Professional Certification Agency (BNSP), Professional Certification Bodies (LSP), KKP and the Indonesian Biodiversity Research Center (KKH PRG), with private and non-state actor support. |
| India | Strengthen capacity for implementation of biosafety measures and biosafety regulatory capacity. | India's NBSAP commits to strengthening capacity for implementation of biosafety measures and biosafety regulatory capacity. The headline indicator references the number of countries that have taken action to implement biosafety measures as set out in Article 8(g) of the Convention and measures for the handling and distribution of benefits of biotechnology as set out in Article 19 (17.b). Six national indicators are tracked: number of Biosafety Laboratories for Living Modified Organisms (LMO) detection in place (17.1); number of guidelines and procedures for LMOs including storage, transportation, and sampling (17.2); number of technical resources prepared and training conducted at regional and national levels for seed inspectors, food safety inspectors, State Agriculture Department officials, State Pollution Control Board staff, and customs officials (17.3); number of online resources for information access and sharing (17.4); number of State Biotechnology Coordination Committees (SBCC) and District Level Committees (DLC) constituted (17.5); and number of LMOs/GMOs that have undergone Risk Assessment and Risk Management (RARM) (17.6). Lead agencies include the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) through the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC), ICAR, Indian Council of Medical Research, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, MoEFCC, and State Governments. |
| Iran | Establish, strengthen capacity for, and implement biosafety measures as set out in Article 8(g) of the CBD and measures for handling biotechnology and distributing its benefits as set out in Article 19 of the Convention. | A sub-target within the NT-15 section commits to establishing, strengthening capacity for, and implementing biosafety measures as set out in Article 8(g) of the CBD and measures for handling biotechnology and distributing its benefits as set out in Article 19 of the Convention. Thirteen actions are listed (one incomplete). The NBSAP calls for implementing accreditation for agricultural products to track and identify their origin, optimising input use, and monitoring food product production and supply in line with biosafety national policies. It legally prohibits the cultivation of any transgenic products produced inside or outside the country on Iranian lands, per the 7th Five-Year Development Plan. A clear and comprehensive regulatory framework for synthetic biology is to be established, addressing research and development, environmental release, and public safety, aligned with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Specific provisions for regulating gene drives are required given their unique risks and benefits. Researchers must conduct thorough risk assessments before field trials or environmental release. Public awareness and participation mechanisms are to be established, along with ethical guidelines addressing creation of artificial life, unintended consequences, and distribution of benefits and risks. The background sections describe Iran's growing synthetic biology research community focused on engineering stress-tolerant plants, recombinant proteins, bioremediation, and synthetic biology tools. The NBSAP notes Iran currently lacks specific regulations governing synthetic biology, relying on general biotechnology, environmental protection, and human health regulations. |
| Iceland | The NBSAP addresses biosafety under Guiding Principle B3. It notes that Iceland has established a legal framework and regulations on genetically modified organisms but has not developed a general legal framework on the utilisation of genetic resources. The policy commits to assessing the status of the legal framework on biosafety and genetically modified organisms and assessing Iceland's position with respect to the Cartagena Protocol on biosafety. The NBSAP's own cross-reference table explicitly identifies a connection to GBF Target 17 on biosafety. | |
| Japan — National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 2023–2030 | The NBSAP addresses biosafety through implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety via the Act on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity through Regulations on the Use of Living Modified Organisms (Cartagena Act). The Act regulates Type 1 (open system) and Type 2 (contained use) use of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs), with risk assessment and approval processes administered jointly by MOE, MAFF, MHLW, METI, MEXT, and the Ministry of Finance. The government will strengthen monitoring of LMOs in the natural environment (including imported GM canola found in port areas) and maintain public consultation on approval decisions. For genome-edited organisms, the government follows the 2019 notification scheme under which genome-edited organisms without introduced foreign genetic material are handled outside the Cartagena Act. Japan will continue to engage in international deliberations under the Cartagena Protocol. | |
| Lebanon | NT 20: By 2030, the implementation mechanism of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is operational. | National Target 20 commits that by 2030 the implementation mechanism of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is operational. Progress is tracked through a contribution to Headline Indicator 17.b (whether Lebanon has implemented biosafety measures under CBD Article 8(g) and biotechnology-handling and benefit-distribution measures under Article 19, with the Biosafety Clearing-House records kept up to date), plus national indicators on pieces of information shared through the BCH, risk assessments undertaken under Article 15 of the Cartagena Protocol, binary trade-control legislation, the number of import controls verifying LMOs, the share of national plant species recorded in a seed bank (baseline 2013–2024) and the use of local and native species enforced at minimum in government-funded projects. National Actions commit to enforcing and operationalising national biosafety legislation through the issuance of implementation mechanisms (NA 20.1); assessing LMO risks and monitoring the adequacy of laboratory testing equipment in certified laboratories (NA 20.2); developing and implementing legislation to control trading and trafficking, especially at national borders (NA 20.3); enforcing stronger customs control over LMO imports (NA 20.4); incentivising and supporting seed banks preserving genetic diversity and promoting awareness of their importance (NA 20.5); and promoting the use of local and native species, enforcing their implementation at minimum in government-funded projects (NA 20.6). |
| Lesotho | By 2030, protection measures are in place for the sound management of living modified organisms that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity as well as pose risks to human health | Lesotho's National Target 9 commits to having protection measures in place by 2030 for the sound management of living modified organisms (LMOs) that may have adverse effects on biodiversity conservation and human health. The total budget is USD 2,041,175. The baseline reports that LMO laboratories have been established at the National University of Lesotho and Agricultural Research. The Biosafety Bill was approved by Cabinet and is awaiting parliament. The Biosafety Policy 2015 has been developed. Awareness campaigns were undertaken through the NBF II Project. Biosafety projects implemented include the Multi Country Project to Strengthen Institutional Capacity on LMO Testing (MCP ICLT) and Support for the Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks for Lesotho (NBF). Strategic Initiative 9.1 includes two actions: developing and implementing policies, strategies and plans on biosafety issues, including reviewing the National Biosafety Policy, enacting biosafety legislation, and revising the Biosafety Awareness Strategy (USD 394,117, 2027/2028); and establishing an effective detection and monitoring system for LMOs, including capacity building, assessment of LMOs status, and development of a national LMOs database (USD 1,647,058, 2027/2028). Indicators include measures for detection and identification of biotechnology products and mechanisms to facilitate sharing of information on potential adverse impacts of biotechnology. |
| Libya | By 2030, develop and implement national, sectoral and local capacity-building programs with regard to technology transfer and scientific research, with a focus on the negative effects of biotechnology on biodiversity and human health, as well as how to control and reduce those effects. | The NBSAP addresses biosafety and biotechnology through two complementary national targets. National Target 13 commits to operationalising the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, including establishing a National Biosafety Committee for Genetic Mutation Products to develop methodologies for tracking genetically modified products and determining approval fees, and creating a national register for reference laboratories in biosafety and biotechnology studies with registration of licences for intentional release into the environment. National Target 17 focuses on capacity building for technology transfer and scientific research, "with a focus on the negative effects of biotechnology on biodiversity and human health, as well as how to control and reduce those effects." Its four priorities include: modernising laws and regulations governing scientific research management and intellectual property (by 2024); including biodiversity-related scientific gaps in university and research centre plans, especially those related to reducing pressures on biological and genetic diversity (by 2030); developing a national programme for external scholarships in cooperation with international institutions for biodiversity research (by 2030); and a national competition to encourage biodiversity-related scientific research (by 2030). The combined budget is USD 23 million (USD 8 million for Target 13, USD 15 million for Target 17). |
| Madagascar | By 2030, measures relating to biotechnological safety, its management and the sharing of its benefits are created and strengthened. | The NBSAP commits that by 2030, measures relating to biotechnological safety, its management and benefit-sharing are created and strengthened. Madagascar already has a regulatory framework and institutions including the CNB (Comité National de Biosécurité) and national laboratories. Seven actions are structured across three strategic axes, with estimated financial needs of USD 6,053,552 (7.50% of Programme 3), allocated as: political, legal and regulatory framework for the prevention of biotechnological risks (USD 2,610,432); institutional strengthening on the prevention of biotechnological risks (USD 2,539,540); and a sustainable financing mechanism linked to biosafety (USD 903,581). Strategic axis 1 updates or develops biosafety policy, legal instruments and strategic tools (indicator 17.b: number of policies and laws adopted), regulatory texts implementing the biosafety law, and regulatory texts governing institutional arrangements and emergency measures. Strategic axis 2 strengthens management structures (ANC, CNB with functional operational mandates), emergency management and research initiatives (plan and manual adopted, exercises, training, research projects), and conducts IEC campaigns on biosafety. Strategic axis 3 seeks sustainable financing mechanisms linked to biosafety and develops regional, multilateral and national collaboration. Legislative and regulatory instruments are aligned with the Cartagena and Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur international protocols and integrated into sectoral and territorial policies. |
| Marshall Islands | Sub-target 3.17 calls for enhanced national capacity to implement biosafety measures, delivered through the Cartagena Protocol framework at the MEA pathway level, with MoNRC as data lead. Binary indicator 17.B (Biosafety Measures) tracks action to implement biosafety measures as set out in CBD Article 8(g) and measures for handling of biotechnology. Action 7 contains detailed Cartagena Protocol obligations. OPC or MoFAT is to formally designate MoNRC as the Competent National Authority (Action 7a). MoNRC is to submit the 5th National Report to the Biosafety Clearing-House by February 28, 2026 (Action 7b). MoNRC is to submit a compliance action plan to regain compliance status, with original deadline May 2024 revised to ASAP but before June 2026 (Action 7c). MoNRC, in coordination with RMI Ports Authority and RMI EPA, is to strengthen national biosafety operational capacity, including developing and implementing biosafety procedures for inspection, monitoring, and control of transboundary movement of living modified organisms at ports of entry, and updating the Biosafety Legislative Review from the 2006 National Biosafety Framework (Action 7d). | |
| Malta | By 2030, potential adverse impacts of biotechnology on biodiversity, and associated risks to human health, are prevented, managed and controlled. | National Target 12 commits that by 2030, potential adverse impacts of biotechnology on biodiversity and associated risks to human health are prevented, managed, and controlled. Action 12.1 requires the National Biosafety Framework Strategy to be updated by 2027 to take into account new obligations, emerging issues, and new techniques, and implemented accordingly. Action 12.2 commits to implementing the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol, to ensure the safe transport, handling, and use of living modified organisms. |
| Malaysia | By 2030, a comprehensive biosafety system is operational to manage the potential and adverse impacts of modern biotechnology on human, plant and animal health, the environment, and biological diversity | Malaysia's NPBD Target 15 commits that "by 2030, a comprehensive biosafety system is operational to manage the potential and adverse impacts of modern biotechnology on human, plant and animal health, the environment, and biological diversity." The policy notes Malaysia is a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) and has implemented the Biosafety Act 2007 to manage Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) and their products. Target 15 has three actions. Action 15.1 (enforcement inspection and biosafety compliance) commits to strengthen coordination and cooperation between agencies regulating LMOs; strengthen regulatory mechanisms and procedural guidelines for monitoring and enforcement; incorporate biosafety principles into sectoral policies, particularly agriculture and health; and increase the number, capacity, and network of laboratories that can detect and identify LMOs and their products. Action 15.2 (impact assessment of LMOs) commits to enhance capacity and guidance for risk assessment, management, and communication for LMOs including those from emerging technologies (synthetic biology, genome editing); increase biosafety-related research (including locally developed LMOs); and establish a mechanism for socio-economic impact assessment. Action 15.3 (emergency response, liability, and redress) commits to develop emergency response plans and trained teams; establish a comprehensive legal framework for liability and redress for damages resulting from transfer, handling, release, or use of LMOs or their products; and strengthen cooperation and coordination on liability and redress. Key Indicator: by 2030, a legal framework to address liability and redress for damage caused by LMOs and their products has been established. The Ministry in charge of biodiversity and forestry is the lead; partners include JBK (Department of Biosafety), DWNP, JPSM, MAQIS, JAKOA, MBC, state agencies, IPTA/IPTS, and CSOs/NGOs. |
| Namibia | The Biosafety Act and regulations are effectively implemented to ensure biosafety and equitable sharing of biotechnology benefits | National Target 17 commits that the Biosafety Act and regulations are effectively implemented to ensure biosafety and equitable sharing of biotechnology benefits. NBSAP 3 adopts an integrated programme approach consolidating legal, institutional, scientific, compliance and awareness-related actions for effective implementation and enforcement of the Biosafety Act and its regulations. The programme prioritises completion and operationalisation of the current review of the Biosafety Act and its regulations, with emphasis over ten years shifting from legislative reform to institutional, technical and enforcement capacity. Regulatory systems governing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and specified GMO products of modern biotechnology are to be science-based, transparent and precautionary. Institutional coordination is strengthened among authorities responsible for environment, agriculture, health, trade, research and border control. In line with Article 19 of the CBD, coordination between biosafety and ABS frameworks is explicitly strengthened to ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from modern biotechnology based on Namibia's genetic resources. The lead institution is NCRST (National Commission on Research, Science and Technology), supported by MEFT, MAFWLR, MHSS, MIT, MHETI, UNAM, NUST, and IUM. Activities cover seven work areas: finalisation of the legal framework, capacity for risk assessment and compliance, institutional coordination, capacity development and training, research and responsible innovation, public awareness and participation, and sustainable resource mobilisation. |
| Netherlands | The NBSAP states that the Netherlands has, together with the EU, fully implemented the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, meaning that the European part of the Netherlands has for years already been compliant with Action Target 17. The legal framework is enumerated per the complementary Global Biodiversity Framework indicators: the Netherlands has the necessary legal and administrative measures in the field of biosafety (Directives 2009/41 and 2001/18, Regulation 1829/2003, and the national GMO Decree and GMO Regulation); has implemented biosafety measures; has the necessary measures and resources for detection and identification of biotechnology products; carries out scientifically sound risk assessments; implements the relevant provisions of the Cartagena Protocol; establishes and implements risk management measures; has legal and technical measures for remediation and compensation (Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability); and has transposed the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol into EU and Dutch legislation. The rules for biotechnology cover three tiers of use: research in enclosed spaces (greenhouses, laboratories); research and trials outside enclosed spaces where safety is established (field trials, clinical research); and, where safety is demonstrated, authorisation as a product on the European market. Consumers may choose whether to opt for genetically modified products, and manufacturers must label products containing 0.9% or more genetically modified content. Information on GMOs and associated risk assessments is made available through the Biosafety Clearing House, the national GMO permits database, and EU databases for deliberate releases and food/feed GMOs. The annex notes that the Cartagena Protocol does not yet apply to Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba. In consultation with the public bodies, an examination is to be conducted into the manner in which the Protocol can be implemented on those islands. | |
| State of Palestine | The NBSAP records that the State of Palestine ratified the Cartagena Protocol of the CBD on 2 April 2015. Following a delayed 2020 call for a biosafety study, the EQA produced a 2021 framework intended to ensure the safe use and implementation of modern biotechnology and to ensure public health, food security, economy and biodiversity protection. The framework sets five objectives for a national biosafety plan: (1) establish a regulatory regime for biosafety covering research, development, testing of GMOs and GM products, environmental release assessment, import and export, and use of all products from modern biotechnology; (2) establish an administrative system defining mandates of the National Competent Authority and stakeholders; (3) establish a transparent decision-making system for handling notifications/requests for activities involving GMOs (transboundary movement, transit, domestic use, contained use, placing on market, intentional release), including risk-assessment and management systems; (4) establish systems for monitoring and enforcement of biosafety measures; (5) build national capacity for biosafety management, including public awareness, education, participation and human-resource development. The legal framework comprises Environmental Law No. 7 of 1999, Public Health Law No. 20 of 2004, Agriculture Law No. 2 of 2003, Palestinian Standards and Measurements Law No. 6 of 2000, with related provisions in the Decree on the Law of Industry No. 10 of 2011 and Consumer Protection Law No. 21 of 2005. Four GMO risk classes (I–IV; negligible/low/moderate/grave) are specified with proportionate safety measures (Permitted; Precautionary approach; Research/experimentation with special permits; Research/testing only). The recommendations include: possible establishment of the Palestinian National Food and Drug Authority; strengthening laws taking into account the Cartagena Protocol; creating a National Biosafety Committee; implementing laws on medical/hazardous/solid waste and radiation; and regional harmonisation. | |
| Paraguay | By 2030, national-level biosafety measures capacity will be strengthened, as well as measures for the management of biotechnology and the distribution of its benefits. | National Target 19 commits that by 2030 national-level biosafety capacity will be strengthened, together with measures for the management of biotechnology and the distribution of its benefits, through a national biotechnology programme ensuring that biotechnological applications (such as modified crops and bioassays) comply with biosafety measures. Indicators include 650 persons trained in biotechnology, 6 biotechnological applications applying biosafety measures, 6 scientific research studies funded with environmental or health focus (baseline 0), 12 awareness campaigns on biotechnology and biosafety, and 100% implementation of the SGT 6 Work Programme roadmap (baseline 0%). Sectoral line 3.6.7 identifies gaps in intellectual property rights, biosafety measures for emerging technologies and regulation of biotechnology in health, environment and agriculture, and promotes biobanks and germplasm banks that integrate biosafety surveillance tools. The One Health approach is identified as an opportunity to integrate biotechnology for managing risks to environmental, human and animal health. Partners include MADES, MAG, CONBIO, CONACYT, Academia, IPTA, MSPBS, Binational Entities, INTN, INFONA, INBIO, SENAVE and SENACSA. |
| Rwanda | By 2030, strengthen capacity for implementing biosafety measures and sustainable use of biotechnology products and services. | The NBSAP sets National Target 17 to strengthen capacity for implementing biosafety measures and sustainable use of biotechnology products and services by 2030. Headline indicators include the number of regulations and guidelines related to biosafety developed and the number of authorisations granted for GMO projects. Component indicators track people trained on biosafety, laboratories accredited for biosafety research, and availability of modern biosafety equipment. Complementary indicators include frequency of monitoring and scientific reports on risk assessment. The baseline notes that Rwanda has enacted the law governing biosafety (Biosafety Law, 2024) and that Ministerial orders on permits and the national biosafety committee are in place. Strategic actions include developing guidelines for effective implementation of the biosafety law, enhancing capacity building of institutions and technical personnel to manage GMO risks, developing mechanisms for equitable sharing of biotechnology benefits, establishing mechanisms for detection and identification of GMOs in plants, food, and feeds, putting in place a monitoring risk assessment system for GMOs, developing guidelines for regulating GMO activities and administrative tools, and enhancing public awareness of biosafety measures. The agriculture sector plan includes developing and implementing biosafety measures for safe handling and transfer of GMOs in the agriculture sector (REMA, 2025–2027). The costing allocates USD 1 million. |
| Saudi Arabia | Activating national regulatory, management, and risk control frameworks related to the handling of genetically modified living organisms on biodiversity and human health, and strengthening capacity building programmes in this field. | National Target 11 aims to activate national regulatory, management, and risk control frameworks related to the handling of genetically modified living organisms, with attention to impacts on biodiversity and human health, and to strengthen capacity-building programmes in this field. The NBSAP explicitly links this to GBF Target 17 on biosafety. The Kingdom acceded to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on 7 November 2007. The NBSAP notes that new national biosafety legislation is being prepared to fulfil Cartagena Protocol obligations regarding handling and transfer of genetically modified organisms. The national action plan includes: selection, development, and strengthening of infrastructure for national reference laboratories capable of detection and identification of living organisms and genetic compliance testing (2028); designing and implementing capacity-building programmes for personnel in ministries, customs, laboratories, and research in biosafety, risk assessment, and law enforcement (2028–2030); establishing mechanisms for handling emergency situations related to unauthorised or unintended release of living modified or genetically modified organisms (2027); and enhancing public awareness on biosafety issues (2026–2030). The analysis of existing legislation confirmed the availability of a national legislative and institutional framework, with the biosafety legislation being prepared to close remaining gaps. |
| Sudan | Establish, strengthen capacity for, and implement in Sudan biosafety measures as set out in Article 8(g) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and measures for the handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits as set out in Article 19 of the Convention. | National Target 17 calls for establishing, strengthening capacity for, and implementing biosafety measures as set out in Article 8(g) of the CBD, and measures for the handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits as set out in Article 19. The NBSAP dedicates Section 8.2.11 to biosafety and biotechnology aspects, and includes a component target (§542) on mobilizing financial support for monitoring and evaluation of biotechnology use and addressing GMO risks on biodiversity. Total budget across all goals is US$9,810,000: US$1,720,000 under Goal A (comprising US$1,250,000 for Target 4 aspects, US$150,000 for Target 7, US$270,000 for Target 14, and US$50,000 for Target 17), US$3,520,000 under Goal B (US$520,000 for Target 10 and US$3,000,000 for Target 17), and US$4,570,000 under Goal D (US$4,370,000 for Target 17 actions including 8 actions, US$50,000 for Target 19, and US$150,000 for Target 21). The gender matrix includes establishment and operationalization of a system for public information, education and participation on biosafety matters, with 50% women as targeted public information recipients and 30% women among participants establishing the system. The monitoring framework tracks biosafety legal and administrative measures, means for detection and identification of biotechnology products, capacity improvement for the biosafety system, number of institutional biosafety committees, public participation in biosafety matters, number of biosafety SOPs developed, and improvement in biosafety laboratories. |
| Slovenia | The NEAP 2020–2030 contains a dedicated biosafety chapter. Slovenia's biosafety system in modern biotechnology is based on the precautionary principle, transparency, a step-by-step approach and case-by-case risk assessment. Activities in modern biotechnology are most intensive in contained-use research, with negligible deliberate release into the environment. The programme notes that Slovenia does not yet have a comprehensive action plan in biotechnology. The biosafety goals commit to maintaining an effective and transparent biosafety system, providing effective protection of biodiversity and prevention of potentially adverse effects on the environment and health, supporting highly responsible practices involving modern biotechnology products at all levels, and preserving favourable socio-economic effects. Table 8 lists measures: periodically overview progress of modern biotechnology and its products at EU and global levels and draft an Action Plan for biotechnology (MOP/MIZŠ/MKGP/MZ/MGRT, by 2025 then ongoing), maintain and update the biosafety system including environmental and health risk assessment (ongoing), and implement control measures and monitoring for safe use of modern biotechnology and its products (ongoing). The estimated annual cost is EUR 150,000 from the national budget. The Strategic Plan's Measure 1.5 commits to maintaining and updating the biological safety system and maintaining the prohibition of growing genetically modified organisms. | |
| Senegal | Strengthen national capacities in biotechnological safety | The NBSAP defines national target (17) as strengthening national capacities in biotechnological safety. The results framework prescribes two priority actions: operationalisation of the National Biosafety Committee and its regulatory framework (indicator: number of cases processed), and operationalisation of the national reference laboratory for GMO control (indicator: number of samples analysed). The institutional architecture assigns a strategic role to the National Biosafety Authority (ANB) and its bodies — the National Biosafety Commission and Technical Committees — as regulatory, control, and scientific monitoring bodies for all aspects related to the use of genetically modified organisms and products derived from modern biotechnologies. Law No. 2022-20 of 14 June 2022 on Biosafety in Senegal provides the legal basis. The sixth guiding principle (Precaution) invokes Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, specifically applying it to biotechnologies with a requirement for "rigorous risk assessment and monitoring." |
| El Salvador — NBSAP Country Page | The NBSAP addresses biosafety under National Target 6 (access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing). El Salvador adopted the Cartagena Protocol in 2003 to regulate the safe use of living modified organisms (LMOs) and their impact on biodiversity and human health. A Special Regulation for the Safe Management of Genetically Modified Living Organisms was enacted in 2008. The indicator framework tracks the number of legal, technical and/or administrative measures in biosafety updated, with a baseline of one regulation as of 2024. KMGBF Target 17 is explicitly listed as an associated global target under National Target 7. The alignment analysis notes that the 2013 NBS and the National Environmental Policy (PNMA) do not address biosafety (Target 17) specifically, 'even though there are efforts in the country in this area.' The inclusion of biosafety measures and indicators in the new NBSAP represents a step toward closing this gap. | |
| Chad | The NBSAP links Global Target 17 to National Target 19 (NT19, on scientific knowledge and technology). Section 6.2 identifies biotechnology (GBT 17) as a biodiversity loss driver addressed by the Cartagena Protocol. The 2011–2020 reference notes the lack of effective implementation of protocols (Cartagena and Nagoya); the 2030 target is the establishment of biotechnological risk management plans derived from the Cartagena Protocol. Measures include implementing control, management and monitoring measures for the individual impacts of biotechnology on biodiversity (all wild species); implementing the Cartagena Protocol on the prevention of biotechnological risks; and developing strict protocols to prevent the negative effects of genetic manipulation on wild species. The indicator is the measures put in place to prevent, manage and control the potential negative effects of biotechnologies on biodiversity, taking into account human health (I1GT17). The national coordination mechanism referenced in the Conclusion (§113) explicitly lists focal points for the Cartagena and Nagoya Protocols. | |
| Togo | Target 11 : Strengthen national capacities in biosafety | The NBSAP designates National Target 11 under Strategic Objective 1, mapped to GBF Target 17, committing to strengthen national capacities in biosafety. Togo has ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2 July 2004) and the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress (9 February 2016). National legislation includes Law No. 001-2009 of 6 January 2009 on the prevention of biotechnological risks in Togo. At the sub-regional level, ECOWAS Regulation No. C/REG.04/09/2020 on the prevention of biotechnological risks applies to transboundary movements, transit, and handling of genetically modified organisms. The institutional framework includes the Scientific and Technical Committee on Biosafety (CSTB), described as the permanent consultation framework for biotechnological risk prevention, with missions including contributing to the definition and periodic revision of national biosafety policy. The CSTB is represented on the national NBSAP monitoring committee. Legislative reform underway includes revision of the Law on Biosafety. Capacity building includes training on biotechnological risk assessment techniques (50 million CFA), with MERF as responsible structure and AUDA/AU, WAEMU/ECOWAS, and the US Embassy as potential partners. |
| Thailand | The plan addresses biosafety in two places. The background (§15) notes Thailand's obligations under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which focuses on management and utilisation of genetically modified organisms. The importance-of-target section for the ABS target (§114) states that biosafety measures are essential to ensure that genetically modified organisms resulting from biotechnology are managed and used with necessary safety precautions, and that use and release of GMOs require regulations, management, and control of associated potential risks. The implementation table under Target 7 (§118) assigns measure 3, 'Strengthen biosafety measures and capabilities to support sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity,' to MOAC (DOA, DOF, DLD), MIND (DIW), MOPH (DMSC), MHESI (BIOTEC), and educational institutions, with MOAC (OPS-MOAC), MOPH (OPS-MOPH), MHESI (NSTDA), and RSPG supporting, across 2023-2027. Sub-measures include (3.1) supporting the implementation and development of biosafety mechanisms and guidelines and (3.2) elevating biosafety control mechanisms of agencies responsible for overseeing and implementing the country's biosafety measures. Recommended actions for National Target 11 (§145) explicitly treat biosafety alongside biotechnology benefit-distribution: (1) strengthening biosafety measures and capacities to regulate, manage, and control risks associated with the use and release of living modified organisms from biotechnology; and (2) equitable access to the results and benefits of biotechnology through participation in biotechnological research using Thailand-provided genetic resources. | |
| Tunisia | The NBSAP addresses biosafety under Measure D4.1, linked to KM-GBF Target 17. The alignment analysis identified Target 17 as having no equivalent in the previous NBSAP 2018-2030. The gaps analysis notes that Tunisia may adopt specific regulations on Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) under the Cartagena Protocol. Measure D4.1 proposes three actions: strengthening the capacity of the national network of laboratories for GMO control, detection, identification, and quantification, noting they lack financial and human capacities and need sequencers, detection materials, and protective equipment (D4.1.1); adopting a legal text on biosafety in Tunisia, noting that a proposed text regulating confined use, deliberate release, marketing, importation, transit, and destruction of GMOs has not yet been adopted (D4.1.2); and strengthening sanitary controls and biosafety standards in the poultry sector (D4.1.3). A Biosafety Strategy and Action Plan already exists. | |
| Uganda | 2.1: By 2030, public awareness, education and participation in biotechnology and biosafety are enhanced. 2.2: By 2030, national capacity for biotechnology applications and use contribute to socio-economic transformation. 2.3: By 2030, the national biotechnology and biosafety law in place. | This is one of the most thoroughly addressed targets. Strategic Objective 2 — "To harness biotechnology for socio-economic transformation with adequate safety measures for human health and environment" — is dedicated to this area and explicitly mapped to KMGBF Target 17. An entire thematic area (Thematic Area 2) is devoted to biotechnology and biosafety with three national targets, detailed action plans, indicators, responsible agencies, and budgets. The NBSAP describes Uganda's biosafety framework in detail. The Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) is designated as the Competent National Authority for regulatory oversight of genetic engineering R&D. The National Biosafety Committee (NBC) has approved over 20 applications since 1996. The National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy was adopted in 2008. Five crops with nine plant novel traits are under Confined Field Trials in three regions, with locally developed improved varieties of bananas, cotton, maize and cassava anticipated to be ready for open release in the next 5-10 years. No GMOs have been officially approved beyond confined field trials. Three national targets under Thematic Area 2 correspond to KMGBF Target 17: - Target 2.1: By 2030, public awareness, education and participation in biotechnology and biosafety are enhanced - Target 2.2: By 2030, national capacity for biotechnology applications and use contributes to socio-economic transformation - Target 2.3: By 2030, the national biotechnology and biosafety law is in place Specific costed activities include conducting a baseline study on public awareness (US$ 100,000), establishing a Biosafety Clearing House (US$ 200,000), specialized biosafety training for regulators and inspectors (US$ 200,000), developing skilled human resources for biotechnology and biosafety (US$ 300,000), promoting infrastructural development and research (US$ 400,000), and developing biotechnology tools for identification, characterization and conservation of biodiversity (US$ 300,000). |
| Viet Nam | The NBSAP commits to establishing legal obligations and a compensation framework for biosafety management related to genetically modified organisms. The Key Solutions section on scientific research calls for conducting more research aimed at managing or mitigating the negative impacts of biotechnology on biodiversity and human health. | |
| Vanuatu | The NBSAP includes eight implementation activities under Target 17, making biosafety one of the most extensively planned areas within Strategic Area 3. Activities include: acceding to the Cartagena Protocol, with progress underway in Parliament for ratification and the accession instrument targeted for signature by June 2026 (MB.16, VUV 2,000,000); reviewing and updating the national Biosafety Framework in compliance with the Cartagena Protocol (MB.17, VUV 2,000,000); developing legislative frameworks to support the Cartagena Protocol (MB.18, VUV 5,000,000); building capacity through community workshops on biosafety (MB.19, VUV 3,000,000, one year); assessing risks and benefits associated with modern biotechnology including synthetic biology (MB.20, VUV 4,500,000); establishing a gene bank with genetic samples and preserving traditional crops by December 2027 (MB.21, VUV 15,000,000); undertaking a nationwide awareness campaign on the Cartagena Protocol (MB.22, VUV 3,000,000); and operationalising the national biosafety framework by establishing a national biosafety committee (MB.23, VUV 1,000,000). A national biosafety framework was previously developed by the then Vanuatu Quarantine and Inspection Services (VQIS), now known as Biosecurity Vanuatu. DEPC, as the lead implementing agency for the UNCBD, will work with relevant stakeholders to domesticate the Cartagena Protocol's international legislation. Target 17 is allocated 20 actions costing VUV 97,000,000. | |
| Yemen | By 2030, train and enhance the competence of all relevant stakeholders in biosafety measures to protect the country's biodiversity and human health, benefit from eco-friendly and health-safe biotechnology, and strengthen monitoring and oversight of the transportation, handling, and use of genetically modified organisms and materials, providing necessary information to consumers in line with the Cartagena Protocol and national legislation. | The NBSAP establishes National Target 15, which addresses biosafety measures aligned to GBF Target 17. The target commits to training and enhancing the competence of all relevant stakeholders in biosafety measures by 2030 to protect the country's biodiversity and human health, benefit from eco-friendly and health-safe biotechnology, and strengthen monitoring and oversight of the transportation, handling, and use of genetically modified organisms and materials, providing necessary information to consumers in line with the Cartagena Protocol and national legislation. The strategy identifies inadequate biosafety management as a factor in genetic resource erosion, noting the inability to control introduction of Living Modified Organisms associated with increasing food and feed imports. The country has limited institutional capacity for management and monitoring of biotechnology and biosafety issues, attributed to limited financial resources, equipment, expertise, and facilities for both the biosafety unit in EPA and quarantine centers. The target appears in Table 7 without a direct GBF mapping number but is operationalized within Pathway 2 alongside invasive species control. Strategic actions include training stakeholders on GMO handling (ACT 2.43) and strengthening legal frameworks for import/export of living organisms, with border capacity strengthening and institutional development activities. |
| Zambia | The NBSAP addresses biosafety through its regulatory framework and the situation analysis on GMOs. Zambia has not commenced growing GMOs, having adopted a precautionary principle as required by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The country developed the Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy of 2003 and enacted the Biosafety Act No. 10 of 2007 with associated regulations and guidelines. Two local laboratories were set up for detecting GMOs. The National Biosafety Authority Board was inaugurated in 2015, charged with regulating research, development, application, import, export, transit, contained use, release, or placing on the market of any genetically modified organism, to prevent harm to human and animal health or damage to the environment and biological diversity. The strategy includes enhancing institutional capacity for implementing the national biosafety framework under the actions for genetic diversity conservation (National Target 12). The M&E framework monitors knowledge, science base, and technologies relating to biodiversity through a national research agenda to be developed by 2016. | |
| Afghanistan | Afghanistan will not address Target 17. Biotechnology is not a significant threat to Afghanistan relative to other more pressing issues. | The NBSAP explicitly states that Afghanistan will not address Target 17. The justification provided is that biotechnology is not a significant threat to Afghanistan relative to other more pressing issues. In Annex 1, all fields for Target 17 — headline indicator, responsibility, cooperators, and completion dates — are marked as "None." |
| Austria | Biosafety is addressed indirectly. Under global engagement, the strategy foresees development and implementation of concrete approaches for Austria to contribute to advancing biodiversity protection in multilateral conventions and organisations, explicitly naming the Cartagena Protocol (Austria's principal international biosafety instrument). Under consumption-related measures, it foresees implementation of capacity-building projects in developing countries on the precautionary-critical handling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in land use and raw material production, addressing risk assessment, socio-economic impacts, detection and monitoring, and strengthening awareness of and access to alternatives. Under research, conducting studies on the impact assessment of the use of genetic engineering methods for 'gene drive' is foreseen, where new genetic engineering methods are used to modify genes so that the manipulated trait is transmitted to all offspring within a few generations. The strategy treats GMOs and biocides banned in Europe as categories of 'biodiversity-damaging' products to be reduced in imports. No national biosafety framework, permitting regime, or benefit-sharing mechanism from biotechnology is described in the included briefing sections. | |
| Switzerland | The NBSAP mentions the Cartagena Protocol alongside the Nagoya Protocol as one of the CBD protocols governing access to genetic resources and biosafety. The Release Ordinance (ordonnance sur la dissémination dans l'environnement), cited in the context of invasive alien species (§35), regulates the release of organisms into the environment. However, the action plan does not include a dedicated discussion of biosafety measures or biotechnology benefit-sharing as framed by Target 17. | |
| Colombia | The NBSAP reports that MinCiencias (Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación) holds information on projects funded to develop and validate new technologies (research, development and innovation), and that these data can be disaggregated to track biotechnological developments between 2014 and 2022. Target 17 appears in the alignment tables under National Target 3 (Harnessing the biodiversity economy). No dedicated headline indicator, quantified commitment or costed action on biosafety is presented in the briefing. | |
| Mauritania — National Biodiversity Strategy 2022–2030 | The review of the 2011-2020 National Biodiversity Strategy notes that Mauritania made notable progress in environmental protection, including the "approval of laws on biosafety." This is cited as a past achievement rather than a forward-looking commitment. The 2022-2030 strategy does not include specific new biosafety measures, biotechnology management actions, or benefit-distribution mechanisms related to biotechnology. | |
| Mexico — Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad de México (ENBioMex) | The alignment analysis identifies Target 17 (Biotechnology management) as one of the targets with the fewest direct actions, at 8% of total ENBioMex actions, with only 13% enabling contributions. Direct contributions are concentrated in Axes 1, 3, and 4. The conclusions note that the low coverage (12% cited there) is due to the very specific theme of biotechnology management. Specific action lines with direct contributions include research in biotechnology and biosafety (1.1.10), genetic research on species of particular interest (1.1.9), GMO risk analysis (4.3.6), regulatory framework for biological control (4.3.5), GMO use (4.4.1), and species monitoring systems (1.4.6). | |
| Norway | The biosafety-related content in the briefing is concentrated on genetic and biological risk from aquaculture rather than on biotechnology regulation in the narrower KMGBF Target 17 sense. Salmon lice and escaped farmed salmon are classified as the greatest threats to anadromous salmonids, with the quality norm for wild salmon finding two-thirds of populations below the sub-standard for genetic integrity. The aquaculture traffic light system (introduced 2016) regulates capacity based on the mortality risk of migrating salmon smolt to salmon lice across 13 production regions; a working group has concluded the current thresholds are not consistent with the quality norm for wild salmon. To better protect wild cod, the Government clarified the ban on cod farming in wild cod spawning areas through a regulatory amendment in winter 2024 following the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research's 2021 report on risks from farmed cod escapes and spawning in net pens. The briefing does not surface a dedicated section on GMO biosafety regulation, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, or risks from synthetic biology; it does note that DSI and synthetic-biology developments feature in ongoing KMGBF follow-up. | |
| Sweden | The NBSAP notes that EU legislation relevant to target 17 on biosafety incorporates the Cartagena Protocol into EU law via Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 on transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms, with implementation also via Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs and Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on GM food and feed. No national-level commitments, new measures, or action programmes specific to biosafety are described in the briefing. | |
| Suriname | Biosafety appears in the NBSAP institutional inventory through the National Biosafety Framework (2004), listed among Suriname's national policies and plans for environmental health and climate change. The strategy does not contain a stand-alone target or action set on biosafety or living modified organisms. Adjacent commitments under Target 1.4 cover laws to register, monitor and control the introduction of invasive alien species and to manage risks to local ecosystem and human health, which border the biosafety topic but do not address LMOs explicitly. The broader narrative on hazardous substances and pollution (mercury, cyanide, biocides) is treated separately under Target 2.2. | |
| Australia | ||
| Benin | ||
| Czechia | ||
| Spain | ||
| European Union | ||
| Luxembourg | Content addressing Target 17 was not identified in this NBSAP. The briefing contains no references to biosafety measures, biotechnology, genetically modified organisms, the Cartagena Protocol, or the distribution of benefits from biotechnology. | |
| Nigeria | ||
| Panama |
Countries that reference this target
52 of 69 NBSAPs
- Argentina
- Belgium
- Burkina Faso
- Brazil
- Bhutan
- Belarus
- Canada
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Republic of the Congo
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Chile
- Cameroon
- China
- Germany
- Denmark
- Egypt
- Eritrea
- Gabon
- United Kingdom
- Equatorial Guinea
- Hungary
- Indonesia
- India
- Iran
- Iceland
- Japan — National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 2023–2030
- Lebanon
- Lesotho
- Libya
- Madagascar
- Marshall Islands
- Malta
- Malaysia
- Namibia
- Netherlands
- State of Palestine
- Paraguay
- Rwanda
- Saudi Arabia
- Sudan
- Slovenia
- Senegal
- El Salvador — NBSAP Country Page
- Chad
- Togo
- Thailand
- Tunisia
- Uganda
- Viet Nam
- Vanuatu
- Yemen
- Zambia